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Executive summary
The regulatory control of nuclear materials (i.e. nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for 
the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. Safeguards are required for Finland to 
comply with international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation – mainly the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This regulatory control is exercised by the Nuclear Materials 
Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). 
The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2011 continued to 
demonstrate that the Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. 
There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected 
materials and activities were in accordance with the licence holders' declarations. STUK 
remarked on the nuclear safeguards systems of one of the stakeholders in 2011, setting 
required actions to comply with procedures.
Safeguards are applied to nuclear materials and activities that can lead to the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons or sensitive nuclear technology. These safeguards include nuclear 
materials accountancy, control, security and reporting of nuclear fuel cycle related 
activities. The main parties involved in a state nuclear safeguards system are the facilities 
that use nuclear materials – often referred to as “license holders” or “operators” – and 
the state authority. A license holder shall take good care of its nuclear materials and the 
state authority shall provide the regulatory control to ensure that the license holder fulfils 
the requirements. Also the control of non-nuclear technology holders and suppliers, to 
ensure the non-proliferation of sensitive technology, is a growing global challenge for all 
stakeholders. In the Finnish legislation all these stakeholders are dealt with as users of 
nuclear energy.
Finland has a significant nuclear power production, but the related nuclear industry is 
rather limited. Most of the declared nuclear materials (uranium, plutonium) in Finland 
reside at the nuclear power plants in Olkiluoto and Loviisa. Additionally, there are the VTT 
research reactor in Espoo and a dozen minor nuclear material holders in Finland. Nuclear 
dual-use items and instrumentation for the third reactor under construction at Olkiluoto 
are being imported and installed. The import licenses are reviewed as applicable to ensure 
the peaceful use of the technology. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and 
the European Commission made their site visits to the construction site prior to the 
installation of safeguards instrumentation and fuel delivery.
The construction of the fourth reactor at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant, a new 
nuclear power plant site at Hanhikivi in Pyhäjoki, and the expansion of the geological 
repository at Olkiluoto to suffice for also the volume applied for the spent fuel from the 
new Olkiluoto four reactor were all authorised in 2010. The safeguards systems for these 
new facilities shall be designed concurrently and in coordination with facility design. In 
order to familiarise the operators’ safeguards staff with the safeguards obligations, a first 
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general course was arranged in June 2011. The course also started the dialogue between 
the operators, STUK, the Commission and the IAEA to expedite and promote safeguards 
approaches at the facilities.
The first inspections at the two new material balance areas in the front end of the 
nuclear fuel cycle were carried out in 2011. Uranium may be economically extracted at 
the Talvivaara mine as one of the by-products of nickel because of the bioheapleaching 
technique developed for large nickel deposits makes the extraction of other metals from low 
grade ore economically viable.  The Harjavalta nickel refinery applied for a licence to refine 
the Talvivaara nickel products. Currently, uranium residuals are extracted from the nickel 
at Harjavalta. Industrial scale mineral processing may start in 2012 after nuclear licensing 
of the Talvivaara mine. 
STUK maintains a central national nuclear materials accountancy system and verifies that 
nuclear activities in Finland are carried out according to the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act 
and Decree, the European Union's legislation and international agreements. These tasks 
are performed to guarantee that Finland can assure itself and the international community 
of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities and materials. In addition to this, the 
IAEA evaluates the success of the state safeguards system and the European Commission 
participates in safeguarding the materials under its jurisdiction.
The number of the routine inspection days of these international inspectorates has been 
reduced significantly owing to the state-level integrated safeguards approach for Finland, 
which is in force since 2008. The number of their inspection days is approximately 20 
days in a year. In 2011, neither the IAEA nor the Commission made any remarks nor did 
they present any required actions based on their inspections. By their nuclear materials 
accountancy and control systems, all licence holders enabled STUK to fulfil its own 
obligations under the international agreements relevant to nuclear safeguards. STUK 
continues with 40 annual inspections and more than 60 inspection days.
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is one of the elements of the 
global nuclear non-proliferation effort. STUK has two roles in relation to the CTBT: 
STUK operates the Finnish National Data Centre (FiNDC) and one of the radionuclide 
laboratories designated in the CTBT. The main task of the FiNDC is to inspect data 
received from the International Monitoring System and to inform the national authority, 
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, about any indications of a nuclear weapons test. The 
FiNDC falls under the non-proliferation process in STUK’s organisation, together with the 
regulatory control of nuclear materials.
A major goal of all current CTBT related activities is the entry into force of the CTBT itself. 
An important prerequisite for such positive political action is that the verification system 
of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is functioning and 
able to provide assurance to all parties that it is impossible to make a clandestine nuclear 
test without getting detected. The FiNDC is committed to its own role in the common 
endeavour so that the verification system of the CTBTO can accomplish its detection task.
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The human resources development at the Nuclear Materials Section during 2011 was 
focused on nuclear materials control, in particular in the front end of the fuel cycle. This 
was partly due to the need to regulate the new stakeholders at Harjavalta and Talvivaara. 
In addition, two fellowship visitors from the Czech Republic could contribute to human 
resources development also at STUK. During the year, uranium exploration, mining and 
milling premises were visited in the Czech Republic, Canada and Zambia.   STUK and the 
Finnish Customs continued the joint multi-year border monitoring development project. 
The project covers updating technical equipment and operational procedures, and customs 
officers training. 
The nuclear accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant in Japan on 11 March 2011 
affected the nuclear community worldwide. At STUK, immediate emergency preparedness 
actions took place in order to analyse the situation in Japan and to promptly serve the 
Finnish citizens, the general public and the media. Because several of STUK staff members 
are assigned also to the emergency preparedness system and media service of STUK, the 
event had a major effect on STUK's human resources including the safeguards staff and 
the analysis system for the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The radionuclide network provided 
reliable measurement data of the dispersion of radionuclides throughout the northern 
hemisphere. The data was analysed as it arrived, and the results were provided to the 
STUK Emergency Preparedness.
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Nuclear non-proliferation is a prerequisite for the 
peaceful use of nuclear materials and nuclear ener-
gy, globally. In order for Finland to have a nuclear 
industry, most of which consists of nuclear energy 
production, it must be ensured that nuclear mate-
rials, equipment, and technology are used only for 
their declared, peaceful purposes. The basis for nu-
clear safeguards is the national system for the reg-
ulatory control of nuclear materials and activities. 
Nuclear safeguards are an integral part of nuclear 
safety and nuclear security, and they are applied 
both to large and to medium-size nuclear indus-
try and to small-scale nuclear material activities. 
Along with safeguards, the regulatory process for 
nuclear non-proliferation includes transport con-
trol, export control, border control, international 
cooperation and conventions, and monitoring com-
pliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty (CTBT).
1.1 International safeguards 
agreements and national legislation
Nuclear safeguards are based on international 
agreements, the most important and extensive of 
which is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT). 
The Treaty Establishing the European Atomic 
Energy Community (the Euratom Treaty) is the 
basis for the nuclear safeguards system of the 
European Union (EU). Finland is bound by both of 
these treaties, and also has several bilateral agree-
ments in the area of peaceful use of nuclear energy. 
Upon joining the EU, Finland’s bilateral agree-
ments with Australia, Canada and the USA were 
partly substituted by the corresponding Euratom 
agreements (see Appendix 3 for the relevant legis-
lation).
1 Nuclear non-proliferation 
implementation in Finland
Finland was the first state where an 
INFCIRC¹/153-type nuclear Safeguards Agreement 
with the IAEA entered into force (INFCIRC/155, 9 
February 1972). When Finland joined the EU (1 
January 1995), this agreement was suspended and 
subsequently the Safeguards Agreement between 
the non-nuclear weapon Member States of the 
EU, the Euratom, and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193) 
entered into force in Finland, on 1 October 1995. 
Finland signed the Additional Protocol (AP) to 
the INFCIRC/193 in Vienna on 22 September 
1998, with the other EU Member States, and rati-
fied it on 8 August 2000. The Additional Protocol 
entered into force in April 30, 2004, when all the 
EU Member States had ratified it. The scope and 
mandate for Euratom nuclear safeguards are de-
fined in the European Commission Regulation No. 
302/2005.
After Finland joined EU as a Member State, 
and therefore joined the Euratom nuclear safe-
guards, a comprehensive national safeguards sys-
tem was maintained, even improved. The basic 
motivation for this is the responsibility assumed 
by Finland for its nuclear safeguards and nuclear 
security under the obligations of the NPT.
The national nuclear safeguards derive their 
mandate and scope from the Finnish Nuclear 
Energy Act and Decree. These were amended dur-
ing 2008 as a result of the general constitution-
based renewal of the Finnish nuclear legislation 
system. The operator’s obligation to have a nu-
clear material accountancy system and the right 
of STUK to oversee the planning of and generation 
of design information for new facilities was intro-
duced from STUK regulations to the Decree.
¹  INFCIRC = IAEA Information Circulars
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As stipulated by the Act, STUK issues de-
tailed regulations on safety and security (the YVL 
Guides) that apply to the use of nuclear energy. 
The YVL Guides most relevant to nuclear safe-
guards are:
•	 Control	of	nuclear	fuel	and	other	nuclear	mate-
rials required in the operation of nuclear power 
plants (Guide YVL 6.1)
•	 The	national	system	of	accounting	for	and	con-
trol of nuclear materials (Guide YVL 6.9)
•	 Reports	 to	 be	 submitted	 on	 nuclear	materials	
(Guide YVL 6.10).
All STUK YVL Guides are under renovation. The 
guides relevant to safeguards will be merged into 
one joint new guide. The draft version has already 
been communicated to the stakeholders. The new 
guides will be issued by the end of 2012. Nuclear 
materials control applies to:
•	 nuclear	 material	 (special	 fissionable	 material	
and source material)
•	 nuclear	dual-use	items	(non-nuclear	materials,	
components, equipment and data suitable for 
producing nuclear energy or nuclear weapons 
as specified in INFCIRC/254, Part 1)
•	 licence	 holders’	 activities,	 expertise,	 prepared-
ness and competence
•	 R&D	activities	related	to	the	nuclear	fuel	cycle
•	 nuclear	security,	and
•	 safeguards	 for	 the	 final	 disposal	 of	 spent	 nu-
clear fuel.
1.2 The parties of the Finnish 
nuclear safeguards system
The main parties involved in the Finnish nuclear 
safeguards system are the authorities and the li-
cence holders. Undistributed responsibility for the 
safety, security and safeguards of the use of nucle-
ar energy is on the licence holder. It is the responsi-
bility of STUK as the competent state authority to 
ensure that the license holders comply with the re-
quirements of the law and the nuclear safeguards 
agreements. To complement the national effort, 
international control is necessary to demonstrate 
credibility and the proper functioning of the na-
tional safeguards system.
1.2.1 Ministries
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) is responsi-
ble for national non-proliferation policy and inter-
national agreements. The MFA is responsible for 
the export licensing of nuclear materials and other 
nuclear dual-use items including sensitive nuclear 
technology. The MFA promotes nuclear safety and 
safeguards in the neighbouring region, and also fi-
nances the inter-institutional cooperation between 
government authorities. 
The Ministry of Employment and the Economy 
(MEE) is the highest authority for the manage-
ment and control of nuclear energy. MEE is re-
sponsible for legislation related to nuclear energy 
and it is also the competent authority mentioned 
in the Euratom Treaty. Also other ministries, such 
as the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of 
Defence contribute to the efficient functioning of 
the national nuclear safeguards system. In govern-
ance, STUK belongs to the administration of the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health.
1.2.2 STUK
According to the Finnish nuclear legislation, STUK 
is responsible for maintaining the national nuclear 
safeguards system in order to prevent proliferation 
of nuclear weapons. STUK regulates the license 
holders’ activities and ensures that the obligations 
of international agreements concerning the peace-
ful use of nuclear materials are met. Regulatory 
control by STUK includes the possession, use, pro-
duction, transfer (national and international), han-
dling, storage, transport, export and import of nu-
clear material and nuclear dual-use items. STUK 
is in charge of Finland’s approval and consultation 
process for IAEA and European Commission in-
spectors. STUK approves an inspector as long as 
there are no such issues related to the person in 
question that might adversely affect nuclear safety 
or security at Finnish facilities or the non-prolif-
eration of nuclear weapons. The new inspector re-
quests are sent for comments to the operators that 
hold construction or operating licenses for nuclear 
facilities. If STUK cannot approve an inspector, 
it assigns the approval process to the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy.
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Nuclear safeguards by the Nuclear Materials 
Section of STUK (see Figure 1 for the organisa-
tional chart and Figure 11 for the staff) cover all 
typical measures of a State System of Accounting 
for and Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC), and 
many other activities besides. STUK reviews the 
license holders’ reports (operational notifications, 
inventory reports), inspects their accountancy, fa-
cilities and transport arrangements on site, and 
performs system audits. Office work constitutes 
90% of the inspection effort. STUK runs a verifi-
cation programme for nuclear activities to assess 
the completeness and correctness of the declara-
tions by the licence holders. Nuclear safeguards 
on the national level are closely linked with other 
functions of nuclear materials control and non-
proliferation: licensing, export control, border con-
trol, transport control, combating illicit trafficking, 
the physical protection of nuclear materials, and 
monitoring compliance with the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) – all duties of 
the STUK Nuclear Materials Section. Nuclear 
safety and particularly nuclear security objectives 
are closely complemented by safeguards objec-
tives. Therefore, the research, development and 
regulatory units in the fields of safety, security 
and safeguards at STUK cooperate under the non-
proliferation framework.
1.2.3 License holders
Essential parts of the national nuclear safeguards 
system are the licence holders, in nuclear terminol-
ogy often called the operators. They perform key 
functions of the national safeguards system: con-
trol of the authentic source data of their nuclear 
materials and accountancy of nuclear material at 
the facility level for each of their material balance 
areas (MBA). Each license holder has to operate 
its safeguards system according to its own nuclear 
materials handbook. The handbook is a part of the 
facility’s quality system and is reviewed and ap-
proved by STUK.
With the basic technical characteristics (BTC) 
submitted by a license holder as groundwork, 
Security Technology
Nuclear Security
Nuclear Materials Section
Figure 1. Several departments and independent units of STUK cooperate under the non-proliferation framework.
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the European Commission shall adopt particu-
lar safeguards provisions (PSP) for that license 
holder. PSP are to be drawn taking into account 
operational and technical constraints and in close 
consultation with both the person or undertaking 
concerned and the relevant member state. Until 
PSP are adopted, the person or undertaking shall 
apply the general provisions of the Commission 
Regulation (Euratom) No 302/2005.
99.8% of all nuclear materials in Finland reside 
at the nuclear power plants (NPP). The nuclear 
material (uranium, plutonium) amounts in Finland 
in 1993–2011 are presented in Figures 2 and 3.
Fortum (MBA WL0V)
Fortum is a partly state-owned energy company, 
one of the largest in the Nordic countries. Fortum 
operates power plants of several types, nuclear 
among others.
The nuclear power plant of Fortum Power and 
Heat is located on the Hästholmen Island in 
Loviisa on the south-east coast of Finland. This 
first NPP to have been built in Finland hosts 
two power reactor units: Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2. 
Loviisa 1 started its electricity production in 1977 
and Loviisa 2 in 1980. These two units share com-
mon fresh and spent fuel storages and for nuclear 
safeguards accountancy purposes the whole NPP 
is counted as one material balance area (MBA code 
WL0V). The electricity generated by the Loviisa 
NPP constitutes circa 10% of the whole electricity 
production in Finland.
Most of the fuel for the Loviisa NPP has 
been imported from the Soviet Union / Russian 
Federation. The spent fuel of the Loviisa NPP was 
returned to the Soviet Union / Russian Federation 
until 1996 and since then the spent fuel has been 
stored in the interim storage due to a change in the 
Finnish nuclear legislation, which today forbids, in 
general, import and export of nuclear waste includ-
ing spent fuel.
The Loviisa NPP site (SSFLOV1), as per the 
requirements of the Additional Protocol, comprises 
the entire Hästholmen Island and extends to the 
0
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Figure 3. Plutonium amount in Finland in 1993–2011.
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Figure 2. Uranium amount in Finland in 1993–2011.
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main gate on the continent. Particular Safeguards 
Provisions for the Loviisa NPP, which define the 
European Commission’s nuclear safeguards pro-
cedures for the facility, have been in force since 
1998. The Facility Attachment of the Safeguards 
Agreement INFCIRC/193 has not been prepared 
for the Loviisa NPP.
Teollisuuden Voima (MBAs W0L1, 
W0L2, W0LS and W0L3)
Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO) owns and oper-
ates a nuclear power plant on the Olkiluoto Island 
in Eurajoki on the west coast of Finland. The 
Olkiluoto NPP consists of two nuclear power reac-
tor units, Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2, and an in-
terim spent fuel storage. Olkiluoto 1 was connected 
to the electricity grid in 1978 and Olkiluoto 2 in 
1980. The Olkiluoto NPP contributes circa 17% of 
the whole electricity production in Finland. At the 
Olkiluoto NPP there are three active material bal-
ance areas (MBA codes W0L1, W0L2, W0LS).
Presently, the uranium in TVO’s nuclear fuel 
is mainly of Australian, Canadian and Russian 
origin. This uranium is enriched in the Russian 
Federation or in the EU and the fuel assemblies 
are manufactured in Spain and Sweden.
The Finnish Government granted a licence for 
constructing a new nuclear reactor, Olkiluoto 3, 
on 17 February 2005. As a part of the licensing 
process, TVO’s plan for arranging the necessary 
measures for preventing proliferation of nuclear 
weapons was approved by STUK. The construction 
and assembly work of the reactor unit is under 
way. The European Commission has assigned the 
MBA code W0L3 for Olkiluoto 3. The initial criti-
cality of the reactor is scheduled for 2014.
New nuclear facilities were granted by the 
Government on 6 May 2010. One of these was the 
Olkiluoto 4 reactor. The geotechnical site charac-
terisation works at the Olkiluoto 4 site began im-
mediately in 2010. The selection of the vendor and 
the supply organisation will take place in the near 
future.
TVO owns most of the area of the Olkiluoto 
Island, but the NPP site (SSFOLK1), as per the 
requirements of the Additional Protocol, comprises 
currently the fenced areas around the reactor units, 
the spent fuel storage and the storage for low and 
intermediate level waste as well as the Olkiluoto 3 
construction site. Particular Safeguards Provisions 
for the Olkiluoto NPP have been in force since 
2007. The Facility Attachment of the Safeguards 
Agreement INFCIRC/193 has not been prepared 
for the Olkiluoto NPP.
VTT FiR1 research reactor (MBA WRRF)
Small amounts of nuclear materials are located at 
facilities other than nuclear power plants. The most 
significant of those facilities is the VTT research 
reactor FiR1 (MBA code WRRF) in Otaniemi, 
Espoo. The research reactor was the first nuclear 
reactor built in Finland. It reached criticality on 27 
March 1962.
Particular Safeguards Provisions that define 
the European Commission’s nuclear safeguards 
procedures for the facility have been in force for 
the VTT FiR1 from 1998. The Facility Attachment 
of the Safeguards Agreement INFCIRC/193 has 
not been prepared for the research reactor.
The VTT FiR1 site (SSFVTT1), as per the re-
quirements of the Additional Protocol, consists of 
the whole building around the research reactor, 
although there are non-nuclear companies and 
university premises in the same building.
STUK (MBA WFRS)
Small quantities of nuclear materials are stored 
by the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety 
Authority (STUK), mainly material no longer in 
use and hence taken into STUK’s custody. STUK 
was founded in 1958 and has been located at its 
current premises in Roihupelto, Helsinki since 
1994. The STUK MBA (WFRS) consists of the 
STUK headquarters and the “Central interim 
storage for small-user radioactive waste” at the 
Olkiluoto NPP site.
The STUK site (SSFSTUK), as per the require-
ments of the Additional Protocol, consists of the 
whole building where STUK’s headquarters are 
located in Helsinki, but non-STUK premises in the 
building are excluded. The storage at Olkiluoto is 
included in the NPP’s site declaration.
The University of Helsinki, Laboratory 
of Radiochemistry (MBA WHEL)
The Laboratory of Radiochemistry at the University 
of Helsinki (HYRL) uses small amounts of nuclear 
materials. HYRL is located at the Kumpula univer-
sity campus in Helsinki.
The HYRL site (SSFHYRL), as per the require-
14
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ments of the Additional Protocol, comprises the 
whole building that hosts the laboratory.
OMG Kokkola Chemicals (MBA WKK0)
The OMG Kokkola Chemicals facility does not use 
nuclear materials as such. However, the by-prod-
ucts of their cobalt purification process contain 
uranium, which qualifies these by-products as nu-
clear material. OMG Kokkola Chemicals has an 
operation license for production, storing and han-
dling nuclear material. OMG Kokkola Chemicals is 
located on the west coast of Finland.
Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta (MBA WNNH)
Norilsk Nickel operates the nickel refining plant 
at Harjavalta in western Finland. The plant was 
commissioned in 1959, expanded in 1995 and again 
in 2002. Norilsk Nickel Finland became part of the 
Russian-based Norilsk Nickel as a result of the 
OM Group’s nickel business acquisition in 2007. 
Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta refinery employs a tech-
nique of sulphuric acid leaching of nickel products. 
The uranium residuals will be extracted from the 
nickel products originating from the Talvivaara 
mine. In March 2010 STUK granted a license to 
extract less than 10  tons of uranium per year. 
The Norilsk Nickel company submitted the basic 
technical characteristics (BTC) to the European 
Commission in December 2010. 
Other nuclear material holders
There are about 10 minor nuclear material holders 
in Finland. One of them is an actual material bal-
ance area: University of Jyväskylä, Department of 
Physics (JYFL, MBA code WDPJ), but in fact the 
nuclear material in JYFL has been derogated and 
exempted by the European Commission and the 
IAEA. Other minor nuclear material holders are 
members of a Catch-All-MBA (CAM), for purposes of 
international nuclear safeguards. Most of these use 
depleted uranium as radiation shielding material.
New operators 
The Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd. mining company an-
nounced on 9 February 2010 its interest in inves-
tigating the recovery of uranium as a separate 
product from its sulphide ore body. The Talvivaara 
deposits in eastern Finland comprise one of the 
largest known sulphide nickel resources in Europe. 
The bioheapleaching technique developed for the 
deposits makes the extraction of metals from low 
grade ore economically viable. Therefore, in addi-
tion to nickel, zinc, copper and cobalt, also uranium 
may be economically extracted and processed at 
the site. The company has submitted license appli-
cations according to the mining and nuclear energy 
legislation in order to recover uranium. The basic 
technical characteristics (BTC) were submitted to 
the European Commission in 2010, and the MBA 
code WTAL has been assigned for the future ura-
nium extraction plant. The environmental impact 
assessment was carried out in 2010; and the pro-
duction of uranium products is expected to start 
during 2012 if all the relevant licence applications 
are granted.
Fennovoima announced on 5 October 2011 its 
decision to locate the new nuclear power plant 
on the Hanhikivi peninsula at Pyhäjoki, on the 
sea coast of the Bay of Bothnia. This was a recent 
major milestone in Finnish nuclear history. The 
Fennovoima company is making preparations with 
vendor candidates. The construction license is ex-
pected to be submitted in five years. The Hanhikivi 
site will be declared as the construction proceeds 
from a virgin green site to the nuclear power plant.
Posiva (MBA W0LF)
Posiva Oy is the company responsible for the fi-
nal disposal of spent nuclear fuel in Finland. It is 
owned by TVO and Fortum. Posiva has been exca-
vating an underground rock characterisation facili-
ty called “Onkalo” in Eurajoki since 2004, and thus 
preparing for the construction of the final disposal 
facility. While neither a nuclear license holder nor 
a nuclear material holder yet, Posiva and its activi-
ties are highly relevant to the national safeguards 
system because Posiva is foreseen to develop a new 
type of facility, the geological repository, where the 
nuclear material cannot be re-verified once it has 
been encapsulated and emplaced.
In the IAEA safeguards approaches it has been 
suggested that the geological formation should be 
under safeguards during the whole lifetime of the 
underground facility. Therefore, Posiva has been 
required to develop a non-proliferation handbook, 
such as a nuclear materials handbook, to describe 
Posiva’s safeguards procedures and reporting sys-
tem already before becoming a nuclear material 
holder. The preliminary basic technical character-
istics (BTC) have been provided and the European 
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Commission has already assigned the MBA code 
W0LF for Onkalo. The facility without nuclear 
materials but having the BTC constitutes a site 
according to the Additional Protocol. The Posiva 
site (SSFPOS1) covers the fenced area around the 
support buildings for the repository construction. 
Other stakeholders
Non-nuclear technology holders and suppliers 
serving nuclear and other industry are obliged to 
take care that non-proliferation sensitive technol-
ogy does not get into the hands of unauthorized 
non-state actors and thereby contribute to the pro-
liferation of mass destruction means. The intro-
duction of the Additional Protocol (1996) extended 
the scope of safeguards to the non-proliferation 
control of nuclear programmes and fuel cycle relat-
ed activities in Member States around the world. 
Additionally, the United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1540 (April 2004) requires every State 
to ensure that export controls, border controls, ma-
terial accountancy and physical protection are effi-
ciently taken care of and calls all States to develop 
appropriate ways to work with and inform indus-
try and the public regarding their obligations. The 
control of non-nuclear technology holders and sup-
pliers to ensure the non-proliferation and peaceful 
use of sensitive technology and dual-use items is a 
growing global challenge for all stakeholders.
Nuclear safeguards are commonly seen as the 
traditional nuclear material accountancy and re-
porting system, the main stakeholders of which 
are the international, regional and local authori-
ties, and the operators. According to the enlarged 
non-proliferation regime and the amendments to 
the Finnish legislation, the companies that have 
activities defined in the Additional Protocol or 
have customers for dual-use equipment abroad are 
under strengthened reporting requirements and 
export control.
1.3 IAEA and Euratom 
safeguards in Finland
The IAEA and the European Commission nuclear 
safeguards both have their separate mandates to 
operate in Finland. These two international inspec-
torates have agreed on  cooperation, which aims 
to reduce undue duplication of effort. The year 
2009 introduced a significant change from the tra-
ditional safeguards procedures in Finland as the 
implementation of integrated safeguards began on 
15 October 2008.
Integrated safeguards include traditional nu-
clear safeguards as per INFCIRC/193, and safe-
guards activities in accordance with the Additional 
Protocol, fitted together. While this should not lead 
to an increase in inspections, it should enable the 
IAEA to assure itself of the absence of undeclared 
nuclear activities in a state. In practice, the num-
ber of IAEA routine interim inspections decreases. 
In contrast to this, the IAEA will additionally per-
form 1–3 unannounced or short notice inspections 
per year in a state that has a number and type of 
nuclear installations that resembles the situation 
in Finland.
The operators report to the European Com-
mission as required per Commission Safe guards 
regulation No 302/2005. It is the Commission’s 
task to audit the license holders’ accounting and re-
porting systems. Both the Commission and STUK 
have increased preparedness for short notice and 
unannounced inspections and complementary ac-
cess (abbreviated SNUICA). Every weekday, one of 
STUK’s inspectors is prepared to attend a possible 
IAEA inspection.
IAEA regular inspections:
Facilities at nuclear power plants (NPP):
•	 Physical	Inventory	Verification	(PIV)	/	Design	
Information	Verification	(DIV)	1/year
•	 Random	Interim	Inspection	(RII)	at	24	h	 
notification	(at	least	1/year)
Spent fuel storages at NPPs
•	 PIV/DIV	1/year
•	 RII	at	2h	i.e.	Unannounced	Inspection	
(UI)/24 h	notification	(at	least	1/year)
Research reactor and locations outside facilities 
(LOF)
•	 PIV/DIV	1/4–6	years
New reactor (OL3), under construction
•	 DIV	and	PIV	later	like	at	the	NPPs
Repository (Onkalo), under construction
•	 PIV/DIV	most	likely	as	at	spent	fuel	storages 
Complementary	accesses	at	2/24	h	notification	to	
verify declared activities or to detect undeclared 
activities.
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The number of IAEA and Euratom routine 
inspections decreased significantly in 2009, as 
defined in the state-level safeguards approach 
for Finland, which was negotiated during 2007 
and 2008. The time difference between the unan-
nounced inspections at the two spent fuel storages 
(i.e. 2 hours for Loviisa and 48 hours for Olkiluoto) 
was due to the difference in the surveillance at the 
storages and in the reasonable access time for a 
STUK inspector. The current notification time (see 
infobox) was reduced to 24 hours for Olkiluoto - the 
same as is applied by the IAEA in all EU member 
States; whereas, after the installation of new sur-
veillance equipment at Loviisa, that notification 
time was kept at 2 hours. STUK continues with an-
nual routines with approximately 40 inspections, 
which enables the reduction in the effort of the 
international inspectorates.
1.4 Verified declarations for 
state evaluations
A state’s declarations on its nuclear materials and 
activities are the basis for the state evaluation by 
the IAEA under the obligations of the Additional 
Protocol. In Finland, the state has delegated its re-
sponsibility for these declarations to STUK. STUK 
has been nominated a site representative, as per 
European Commission regulation No 302/2005. 
STUK collects, inspects and reviews the relevant 
information and then submits the compiled decla-
rations timely to the Commission and to the IAEA.
In Finland, there are currently six sites in the 
sense of the Additional Protocol: the two nuclear 
power plant (NPP) sites in Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
respectively, the geological repository site in 
Olkiluoto, and three minor sites: the Technical 
Research Centre of Finland (VTT), the Radiation 
and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) and the 
Laboratory of Radiochemistry at the University of 
Helsinki (HYRL). STUK reviews and verifies the 
correctness and completeness of the information 
about the sites provided by the stakeholders.
STUK reviews annually the information about 
research and development activities that might be 
eligible for declaration, as well as activities speci-
fied in Annex I of the Additional Protocol. STUK 
maintains the information on general plans related 
to the nuclear fuel cycle for the next 10 years and 
keeps account of the exports of specified equipment 
and non-nuclear materials, as listed in Annex II of 
the Additional Protocol.
Technical analysis methods are one tool for a 
state nuclear safeguards system to ensure that nu-
clear materials and activities within the state are 
in accordance with the licence holders’ declarations 
and that there are no undeclared activities. Such 
methods can provide information on the identity 
of the nuclear materials and confirm that licence 
holders’ declarations are correct and complete with 
respect to e.g. the enrichment of uranium, the 
burnup, and the cooling time of nuclear fuel. The 
technical analysis methods in use are non-destruc-
tive assay (NDA), environmental sampling and 
satellite imagery.
STUK employs three NDA methods for verify-
ing spent nuclear fuel. One method lends itself for 
rapid scanning, as the detector is mounted on the 
fuel transfer machine and the fuel elements can be 
measured from above the fuel pond without moving 
the elements. The other two methods, on the other 
hand, allow confirming with greater confidence the 
correctness of the declared burnup and the cooling 
time. With the most precise method, the absence 
of a fuel pin or pins from a fuel element can be 
discovered. STUK reports to the Commission and 
the IAEA about the NDA measurement campaigns.
All nuclear materials leave traces of their iden-
tity, source of origin and treatment. Safeguards 
environmental samples (ES) are used to investi-
gate these traces, which provide further clarity in 
establishing whether the nuclear activities are in 
accordance with the declarations. In the Finnish 
nuclear safeguards system environmental samples 
are collected as surface swipes. The IAEA may col-
lect independent environmental samples during its 
complementary access type of inspections.
Satellite imagery is applied to verify the site 
declaration pursuant to the Additional Protocol. 
Timely imagery is used to monitor different kinds 
of activities at the sites or elsewhere in Finland. 
STUK contributes to the work of the satellite im-
age analysts of the IAEA and the Commission.
1.5 Export/import control and 
licensing as elements of 
nuclear non-proliferation
According to the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act, in 
addition to nuclear materials also other nuclear 
fuel cycle related activities are under regulatory 
control. A license is required for possession, trans-
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fer and import of components, equipment, materi-
als and technology suitable for producing nuclear 
energy (nuclear dual-use items).
The list of these other items is based on Nuclear 
Suppliers’ Group (NSG) Guidelines (INFCIRC/254 
Part 1). The license holder is required to provide 
STUK annually with a list of the above mentioned 
items. Moreover, the export, import, and transfer of 
such items shall be reported to STUK.
Mining and mineral processing operations that 
aim to produce uranium or thorium are also under 
nuclear safeguards and regulatory nuclear safety 
control. In order to carry out these activities a 
national license and an accounting system to keep 
track of the amounts of uranium and thorium are 
required. A national license is also required to 
export and import uranium or thorium ore, and 
these activities must be authorised by the Euratom 
Supply Agency and the European Commission. 
These mining and milling activities and production 
shall be reported to STUK, to the Commission and 
to the IAEA. 
Finland’s export control system is based on the 
EU Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 
2009 setting up a Community regime for the con-
trol of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of 
dual-use items. The export of Nuclear Suppliers’ 
Group (NSG) Part 1 and Part 2 items is regu-
lated by the Finnish Act on the Control of Exports 
of Dual-Use Goods. The licensing authority is 
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. An authorisation 
is required to export nuclear items outside the 
European Union. A license is also required for EU 
internal transfers of NSG Part 1 items, excluding 
non-sensitive nuclear materials.
1.6 The regulatory control of transport 
covers nuclear materials
The requirements for the transport of radioactive 
material are set in the Finnish regulations on the 
transport of dangerous goods. The requirements 
are based on the IAEA safety standard Regulations 
for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, TS-
R-1, and their purpose is to protect people, prop-
erty and the environment from the harmful effects 
of radiation during transports of radioactive mate-
rial. Based on these regulations, STUK is the com-
petent national authority for the regulatory control 
regarding the transport of radioactive material.
In addition to the dangerous goods transport 
regulations, the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act sets 
specific requirements for the transport of nuclear 
material and nuclear waste: generally a licence 
granted by STUK is needed for such a transport. 
Usually the transport licences are granted for a 
fixed period, typically for a few years. A transport 
plan and a transport security plan approved by 
STUK are mandatory for each transport of nuclear 
material or nuclear waste. A certificate of nuclear 
liability insurance shall also be delivered to STUK 
before the transport. Furthermore, a package may 
be used for the transport of fissile nuclear material 
only after the package design has been approved 
by STUK.
1.7 STUK’s contribution to international 
safeguards development
Nuclear non-proliferation is, by its nature, an in-
ternational domain. STUK therefore actively par-
ticipates in international nuclear safeguards re-
lated cooperation and development efforts.
STUK is a member of the European Safeguards 
Research and Development Association (ESARDA), 
and has nominated Finnish experts to its commit-
tees and most of its working groups. STUK partici-
pates in the ESARDA Executive Board meetings 
and in several working groups.
Upon request by the IAEA, STUK’s experts 
have contributed to the IAEA’s international evalu-
ation missions, such as the International SSAC 
Advisory Service (ISSAS). The ISSAS mission re-
views State Systems of Accounting for and Control 
of Nuclear Materials (SSAC) and provides sugges-
tions for improving them.
STUK’s Expert Services and Nuclear Materials 
Section promote safeguards implementation and 
good practices worldwide. These sections plan and 
arrange training and education on request.
STUK keeps close contacts with the respective 
Nordic authority organisations. The development 
of geological repositories for the disposal of spent 
nuclear fuel deepens the cooperation between 
Finland and Sweden.
1.8 The Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) is an important part of the international 
regime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weap-
ons. The CTBT bans any nuclear weapon test ex-
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plosions in any environment. This ban is aimed 
at constraining the development and qualitative 
improvement of nuclear weapons, including also 
the development of advanced new types of nuclear 
weapons.
The CTBT was adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly, and was opened for signature 
in New York on 24 September 1996. The CTBT 
will enter into force after it has been ratified 
by the 44 states listed in its Annex 2. These 44 
states participated in the 1996 session of the 
Conference on Disarmament and possess nuclear 
power or research reactors. On December 6, 2011 
the Indonesian parliament approved ratification of 
the CTBT, bringing the treaty one important step 
closer to entry into force. 
A global verification regime is being established 
in order to monitor compliance with the CTBT. The 
verification regime consists of the following ele-
ments: the International Monitoring System (IMS), 
a consultation and clarification process, on-site in-
spections and confidence-building measures.
Finland signed the CTBT on its day of opening 
in 1996 and ratified it less than three years later. 
In addition to complying with the basic require-
ment of the CTBT of not to carry out any nuclear 
weapons tests, Finland actively takes part in the 
development of the verification regime.
In the CTBT framework, the Finnish national 
authority is the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. STUK 
has two roles: STUK operates the Finnish National 
Data Centre (FiNDC) and one of the sixteen radio-
nuclide laboratories in the IMS (RL07). The most 
important task of the FiNDC is to inspect data 
received from the IMS and inform the national au-
thority about any indications of a nuclear weapons 
test. The radionuclide laboratory contributes to 
the IMS by providing support in the radionuclide 
analyses and in the quality control of the radio-
nuclide station network. The third major national 
collaborator is the Institute of Seismology at the 
University of Helsinki, which runs an IMS seismol-
ogy station (PS17 in Lahti), and provides analysis 
of waveform IMS data (Figure 4).
1.9 Nuclear safeguards and 
nuclear security 
STUK is the national authority for the regulatory 
control of nuclear and radiological safety, security 
and safeguards. All these three regimes are means 
to a common end: protection of people, society, envi-
ronment and future generations from the harmful 
effects of ionising radiation. From the definition 
of nuclear security, it is clear that the majority 
of the activities that aim at non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons, nuclear materials and sensitive 
nuclear technology contribute to nuclear security. 
Moreover, such classical elements of security as 
physical protection of nuclear materials and facili-
ties contribute to non-proliferation. Within STUK’s 
organisation, some of its nuclear security related 
Figure 4. The Finnish CTBT organisation.
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty (CTBT) Status (31.12.2011)
•	 CTBT	Member	States	 182
•	 Total	Ratifications	 155*
•	 Annex	2	Ratifications	 35*
*	The	Indonesian	parliament	approved	 
ratification	on	6	Dec	2011.
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tasks fall – solely or partly – under the duties 
of the nuclear non-proliferation process and the 
Nuclear Materials Section:
•	 the	 national	 system	 for	 the	 control	 of	 nuclear	
materials and nuclear dual-use items, which 
facilitates international nuclear safeguards ac-
tivities in Finland
•	 the	 regulatory	 control	 of	 the	 transport	 of	 nu-
clear materials and nuclear waste
•	 import	and	export	control
•	 advising	 the	 Finnish	 Customs	 on	 radiation	
monitoring and interpretation of radiation de-
tections at the borders, concept development 
and technical specifications; providing more so-
phisticated on-site measurements and analyses 
in response to border monitoring alarms and 
training Customs officers
•	 participation	 in	 the	 work	 of	 the	 international	
nuclear safeguards and nuclear security com-
munities and working groups (IAEA, ESARDA, 
AQG, ITWG…), and
•	 participation	 in	 STUK’s	 response	 in	 cases	 of	
radiological or nuclear incidents.
The Finnish regulatory system for nuclear security 
was audited by an IPPAS mission in 2009. One 
of the recommendations arising from the audit, 
namely the need for more detailed security require-
ments for minor holders of nuclear materials, was 
in the Nuclear Materials Section’s area of responsi-
bility. As a result, the new regulation on safety and 
security, i.e. the YVL Guide for nuclear materials 
control, under review since 2010 and expected to 
come into force in 2012, will contain more detailed 
security requirements for these minor holders.
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2 Themes of the year 2011
2.1 Safeguards for new facilities
The Government approved three Decisions-in-
Principle in 2010: for TVO’s Olkiluoto 4 unit, for 
Posiva’s spent fuel management project related to 
Olkiluoto 4, as well as for Fennovoima’s new nu-
clear power plant. The applicants for new nuclear 
power plants are required to submit their nuclear 
construction license applications within five years. 
The facility construction may start after the li-
cense is granted. Owing to the authorisation of 
these three new nuclear facilities, STUK initiated 
negotiations with the operators and the European 
Commission and the IAEA to prepare for the imple-
mentation of safeguards timely and in coordination 
with facility development. The first 3-day course on 
the implementation of safeguards by design was 
arranged at Sannäs Manor 15-17 June 2011 in 
close cooperation with STUK, the Commission and 
the IAEA, under the IAEA Safeguards-by-Design 
initiative. As a follow-up action, separate one-day 
meetings were held with the new facility man-
agers and developers in September and October 
to facilitate early interaction between facility de-
signers and the safeguards authorities. Finally, on 
5 October 2011 Fennovoima announced its deci-
sion to build the new nuclear power plant on the 
Hanhikivi peninsula in Pyhäjoki.
The topics discussed with new and also operat-
ing facilities were the needs to facilitate nuclear 
material verification, remote monitoring and data 
transmission. In order to initiate remote data 
transmissions from the containment and surveil-
lance equipment operating at the Finnish facilities, 
STUK arranged a first meeting on 24 May 2011 
between the Finnish operators and the authorities. 
In connection to the routine inspections in October, 
safeguards inspectors and technician of the IAEA 
and the Commission visited the Loviisa nuclear 
power plant and the Olkiluoto construction sites 
and familiarised themselves with the current prac-
tises and possibilities to find technical solutions 
to begin with remote data transmission. This new 
automated method is expected to reduce the num-
ber of international inspection days in Finland in 
the near future. The major advantage is improved 
data transfer security compared with the current 
practices, i.e. an inspector personally carrying the 
confidential data.
One major obstacle in applying safeguards to 
new facilities has been the lack of clear regulations 
for safeguards measures and implementation. 
The planning and implementation of safeguards 
measures for a new facility begins, in the tradi-
tional approach to safeguards, after the design 
and construction phase, when the formal Design 
Information is available to the IAEA. However, 
the experiences obtained from current construc-
tion projects clearly show the need to bring in 
the safeguards requirements at an early stage of 
facility design, much before the complete formal 
Design Information is available. Thus an early 
interaction between the stakeholders in nuclear 
non-proliferation and security issues should be ini-
tiated in a similar manner as in the nuclear safety 
assessment. The 2011 revision of the IAEA Safety 
Standards Series NS-R-1 “Safety of Nuclear Power 
Plants: Design” (GOV/2011/43, 10 August 2011) in-
cludes also provision for safeguards and security to 
be applied in an early phase of facility design. The 
revised standard facilitates the early planning of 
safeguards instrumentation for containment and 
surveillance, non-destructive assay, remote data 
transmission etc. needed for the implementation of 
cost-efficient, information-driven IAEA safeguards 
at new facilities.
The first STUK and Commission inspections of 
the uranium production at the Harjavalta nickel 
refinery and at the Talvivaara mine took place 
in 2011. These companies are studying methods 
to extract uranium from their nickel production 
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processes. Industrial scale mineral processing may 
start in 2012 after commercial agreements and nu-
clear licensing. The first inspections to these new 
stakeholders are described in detail in the imple-
mentation section 3.1.8 of this report.
2.2 The Fukushima event – the 
international concern of 2011
The Tohoku pacific earthquake of magnitude 9.0, 
followed by a tsunami and the consequent nuclear 
accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power 
plant in Japan on 11 March 2011 shocked the nu-
clear community worldwide. The tsunami gener-
ated by the massive earthquake seriously damaged 
the site. The loss of electricity, i.e. both on-site and 
off-site power and back-up generators, and later 
also battery back-ups, resulted in the loss of the 
reactors’ cooling systems and further in a nuclear 
disaster that was followed by the media as online 
as possible.
At STUK, emergency preparedness actions took 
place 24 hours a day for two weeks in order 
to analyse the situation in Japan and to serve 
the Finnish citizens, public and media promptly. 
During the first days of the incident media was 
present at STUK premises following the analysis 
and near time prognosis for expected and reported 
radioactive releases due to the accident. STUK is-
sued daily and later weekly media releases. The 
accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant 
highlighted the need for effective communication 
of information about emergency incidents to states 
and relevant organisations (e.g. the IAEA). 
In principle, a natural disaster that takes place 
on the other side of the globe should not affect 
the daily work of a safeguards inspector much. 
However, several of STUK staff members are as-
signed also to the Emergency Preparedness and 
the Public Communications of STUK. Therefore, 
the event had a major effect to STUK human re-
sources, including the safeguards staff and the 
analysis system for the Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). In particular, the process 
to simultaneously renew all the new STUK regula-
tions, the YVL Guides, is delayed since tens of staff 
members of the nuclear reactor safety regulation 
department have been involved in the analysis 
of the Fukushima event. The Finnish authorities 
and nuclear facilities have carried out the stress 
test required by the Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy and the European Commission. As 
requested, on 30 December 2011 STUK sent a 
national final report on nuclear power plant stress 
tests to the Commission. According to the report, 
a tsunami similar to the one that hit Fukushima 
is not possible in Finland, but nevertheless the 
Finnish nuclear power plants are investigating 
the need to improve provisions for extreme natural 
phenomena and for the simultaneous loss of the 
operational capacity of several safety systems. The 
national reports will be reviewed in 2012.
The international monitoring system of the 
CTBT organisation includes global networks of 
seismic and radionuclide measuring stations. The 
seismic network provides real-time data to tsu-
nami warning systems, and was able to assist 
in warning the Japanese public of the tsunami. 
The radionuclide network provided reliable meas-
urement data of the dispersion of radionuclides 
throughout the northern hemisphere. The Finnish 
national data centre for the CTBT (FiNDC) ana-
lysed the International Monitoring System data 
as it arrived, and provided the STUK Emergency 
Preparedness with information, which was unique 
in its reliability and global coverage. FiNDC also 
initiated an informal international cooperation 
between NDCs and affiliated organisations and 
distributed analyses results to several countries, 
for some weeks after the accident, while getting 
valuable information in return.
2.3 Competences at the operators 
are under control
Essential parts of the national nuclear safeguards 
system are competent stakeholders. Each license 
holder has to operate its safeguards system accord-
ing to its own nuclear materials handbook. The 
handbook is a part of the facility’s quality system 
and is reviewed and approved by STUK. According 
to the Nuclear Energy Act as amended in 2008, the 
management system of a nuclear facility shall pay 
particular attention to the impact of safety related 
opinions and the attitudes of the management and 
personnel towards the maintenance and develop-
ment of safety. The licensee shall appoint persons 
responsible for ensuring emergency response ar-
rangements, security and the control of nuclear 
materials. The new STUK requirement, i.e. the 
YVL Guide under preparation for nuclear material 
accountancy and control, will require the licensee 
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to nominate a deputy for the person responsible for 
the control of nuclear materials. 
Moreover, the licensee has to appoint a re-
sponsible manager and his or her deputy for the 
construction or operation of a nuclear facility; for 
mining and milling operations aimed at producing 
uranium or thorium; and for the possession, manu-
facture, production, handling, use, storage and 
transport of nuclear materials and nuclear waste. 
It is the responsible manager’s task to ensure that 
the provisions, licence conditions and regulations 
issued by STUK, concerning the safe use of nuclear 
energy, the arrangements for security and emer-
gencies, and the control of nuclear materials, are 
complied with. The licensee shall ensure that the 
responsible manager occupies the position required 
by the task and possesses adequate authority and 
the actual prerequisites required for bearing the 
responsibility vested in him or her. Only persons 
approved by STUK specifically for each position 
can be appointed.
In order to control that the safeguards proce-
dures are taken care of by the management system 
of each of the licensees, STUK examines, through 
interviews, that the responsible managers and 
persons responsible for safeguards arrangements, 
including nuclear material accountancy and con-
trol, have an adequate position in their organisa-
tions and that they are aware of their tasks so they 
can fulfil the requirements set by the legislation. 
In 2011, STUK interviewed and approved nine 
persons to be appointed for these positions, which 
is the highest number of approvals per year thus 
far. In addition, STUK examined the updates of 
two nuclear materials handbooks. The first edu-
cational course for Finnish operators, mainly for 
nuclear power plant staff, was arranged in June 
2011 at Sannäs Manor, as mentioned above. After 
the entry into force of the new STUK requirement 
to nominate deputy persons for safeguards control 
and for also every minor nuclear material holder to 
have a nuclear materials handbook, the number of 
interviews and approvals will grow in the future.
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3 Safeguards activities in 2011
3.1 The regulatory control of 
nuclear materials
STUK continued with national safeguards meas-
ures as in the past. In 2011 the focus was on minor 
nuclear material holders and new stakeholders, 
which increased the number of STUK inspection 
days. Nuclear material inventories at the end of 
2011 are shown in Tables 2 and 3 in Appendix 1. 
The development of inspections and inspection 
person days per Material Balance Area (MBA) is 
presented in Figures 5 and 6. The inspections by 
STUK, the IAEA and the European Commission in 
2011 are presented in Appendix 2.
The application of integrated safeguards be-
gan in Finland on 15 October 2008. Thus, in the 
year 2009 the number of IAEA inspections was 
reduced from approximately 25 person days to 
15. Similarly, the Commission reduced its inspec-
tion activities significantly. In 2010 the number 
of inspection days rose somewhat owing to the 
first inspections at the geological repository site, 
additional inspection days at the Loviisa Nuclear 
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Power Plant (NPP) and the increased number of 
random inspections in Finland. In 2011 STUK, 
the Commission and the IAEA had more frequent 
meetings that usual in order to agree on proce-
dures for safeguards for new facilities, including 
the final disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel, 
and also for beginning with remote data transmis-
sion in Finland. The site surveys for beginning 
with remote data transmission were combined 
with the regular inspections in October. As a conse-
quence, the number of regular inspections in 2011 
remained at the same level as in 2010, i.e. the cur-
rent number of the annual IAEA inspection days in 
Finland is around 20 person days.
3.1.1 Declarations and approvals of 
new international inspectors
All the relevant license holders sent their updated 
information for the national declaration, which 
is compiled by STUK, in time by 1 March 2011. 
STUK submitted Finland’s annual declaration up-
dates to the Commission on 28 March and to the 
IAEA on 13 May as required. Additionally, STUK 
submitted the quarterly declarations on exports in 
February, May, August and November.
In 2011, altogether 67 IAEA and 10 European 
Commission new inspectors were approved to per-
form inspections at nuclear facilities in Finland.
3.1.2 The Loviisa nuclear power plant site
In 2011, STUK approved one new person to be ap-
pointed deputy responsible manager and one to be 
deputy for the person responsible for nuclear safe-
guards at the Loviisa NPP. In addition, one person 
responsible for the nuclear safeguards of dual-use 
items and sensitive technology in the operator’s 
organisation was approved. In 2011 STUK granted 
the operating company Fortum three import li-
censes for nuclear dual-use items, i.e. equipment 
used in nuclear reactors.
STUK inspected and verified the annual site 
declaration on 2 March 2011. The IAEA carried out 
a complementary access - with the presence of the 
Commission and STUK – to the site on 22 March 
2011 in order to verify the absence of undeclared 
activities and the status of the latest, i.e., the 2010 
declaration. The new solidification plant and the 
underground premises, which are both under con-
struction, were the main targets of the complemen-
tary access. In addition, the IAEA carried out an 
unannounced inspection to the spent fuel storage 
on 23 November. As results, a few recommenda-
tions to improve the site declaration and the design 
information were suggested.
The refuelling and maintenance outage of the 
Loviisa 1 reactor unit took place 21 August – 7 
September 2011, and that of the Loviisa 2 reactor 
unit 10 September – 30 September 2011. Owing 
to the new integrated safeguards approach for 
Finland, the IAEA and the Commission performed 
a before Physical Inventory Taking (pre-PIT) in-
spection with STUK before the outage, on 18–19 
August 2011. Temporary surveillance cameras 
were installed in the reactor halls for the outage 
period, and removed during the Physical Inventory 
Verification (PIV) carried out after the outage, 3–4 
October 2011. Remote Data Transmission in the 
future was discussed with the operator in con-
nection to this inspection. During the outage and 
before the closing of each reactor, STUK identified 
the fuel assemblies in the reactor cores and item 
counted the loading ponds. The Loviisa 1 core was 
inspected on 29 August 2011 and the Loviisa 2 core 
on 19 September 2011. During the outage, the cask 
transfer was inspected on 30 August 2011 by the 
IAEA and the Commission. In addition to the PIV 
and the core controls, STUK carried out two rou-
tine inspections and two measurement campaigns. 
At the Loviisa NPP STUK performed one non-
destructive assay (NDA) verification measurement 
campaign on spent fuel elements in 2011. Since 
there was only a single campaign this year, as op-
posed to two in the previous years, the campaign 
Figure 7. The Finnish State System of Accounting for 
and Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC) staff and 
STUK emergency officer on duty reviewing the pro-
cedures to urgently contact the on-alert short notice 
and unannounced inspections and complementary 
access (SNUICA) inspector and the facility safeguards 
staff after receiving the fax indicating an unannounced 
inspection at Loviisa.
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was extended to three days from two days in previ-
ous years. Taking into account the time that goes to 
setting up the measurement devices, this extension 
effectively doubled the measurement time of the 
campaign. The campaign, 31 October – 2 November, 
was carried out with FORK equipment (named for 
its physical resemblance of a fork), which delivers 
a gross gamma signal from an ionisation chamber 
and a neutron count rate from a fission chamber. 
STUK’s FORK equipment is sometimes referred 
to as enhanced FORK (eFORK), because it incor-
porates a CdZnTe-gamma spectrometer, too. 40 
assemblies were successfully verified during this 
campaign, compared to 21 assemblies and 2 dum-
mies in the previous year’s two-day campaign. The 
measurements and the environmental samples 
collected at the Loviisa NPP did not indicate any 
inconsistencies in the reporting by the operator.
Based on its own assessment as well as on 
IAEA and Commission inspection results, STUK 
concluded that Fortum’s Loviisa NPP has complied 
with its nuclear safeguards obligations in 2011.
3.1.3 The Olkiluoto nuclear power plant site
In 2011, STUK approved one new person to be ap-
pointed deputy for the person responsible for nu-
clear safeguards and nuclear material accountancy 
for the international transfers of uranium at the 
operating company TVO. During 2011 STUK also 
granted to TVO eight import licences and three 
possession licenses. These covered the import of 
fresh nuclear fuel and nuclear dual-use items, i.e. 
technology and instrumentation for the operating 
units and equipment to the new unit under con-
struction. The possession licenses were needed for 
temporary storage of components in the harbour of 
Olkiluoto.
During 2010 and 2011, old superheaters weigh-
ing in total about 700 tonnes were transported by 
M/S Sigyn to Sweden, to be treated in Studsvik. 
With Studsvik’s treatment concept it is usually 
possible to free release and recycle 80–90 per cent 
of the metals in the end-of-life components, which 
reduces both storage costs and the environmental 
impact. Residual products from the treatment are 
sent back to Finland for final storage. During 2011 
residual products were transported from Sweden 
to Finland in several shipments. Most of the ma-
terial was transported back to Finland but a few 
shipments are scheduled to 2012.
The refuelling and maintenance outage of the 
Olkiluoto 1 reactor unit took place 1–11 May 2011 
and that of the Olkiluoto 2 reactor unit 10 May 
– 8 June 2011. Similarly to the Loviisa NPP, the 
IAEA and the Commission performed a pre-PIT 
inspection with STUK 26–27 April 2011, before the 
outage, and the PIV after the outage, 28–29 June 
2011. The outage at the Olkiluoto 2 unit was the 
longest maintenance break in the facility’s history. 
It took 29 days to replace and upgrade turbines, 
coolant systems etc. The power output was in-
creased with almost 20 MW similarly to Olkiluoto 
1 in the previous year.
During the refuelling and maintenance out-
age STUK identified the fuel assemblies in the 
reactor cores and verified and item counted the 
loading ponds before the reactors were closed. The 
Olkiluoto 1 reactor was inspected on 6 May 2011 
and the Olkiluoto 2 reactor on 3 June 2011.
IAEA’s short notice random interim inspec-
tion addressed to the Olkiluoto NPP was carried 
out on 16 November at the reactor unit 1. STUK 
carried out two additional routine inspections of 
the Olkiluoto site and the material balance areas 
(MBA) at the Olkiluoto NPP.
At the Olkiluoto NPP STUK performed two 
non-destructive assay (NDA) verification measure-
ment campaigns on spent fuel elements in 2011: 
31 August to 2 September on Olkiluoto 1 spent 
fuel pool and 10 to 12 October on Olkiluoto 2 spent 
fuel pool. During both of the campaigns STUK per-
formed Gamma Burnup Verification (GBUV) meas-
urements. Altogether 69 spent fuel assemblies 
were verified. The results were archived in the 
mobile version of the NDA measurement database.
The measurement campaigns were targeted 
on the reactor building spent fuel pools since the 
construction of the spent fuel storage enlargement 
severely limited measurement access to spent fuel 
in the storage. Therefore, there were no spent fuel 
transfers to the spent fuel storage at Olkiluoto in 
2011. This situation is expected to continue for few 
more years.
The construction of the new Olkiluoto 3 reactor 
(OL-3) has proceeded to such a stage that nuclear 
dual-use items are being installed at the site. The 
main components are under assembly and STUK’s 
regulatory control. TVO prepared a draft for the 
basic technical characteristics (BTC) of the new 
unit in 2008. This first BTC was reviewed by 
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STUK, the IAEA, and the Commission twice in 
2008. Thus, the inspectorates have the possibility 
to plan the surveillance and containment measures 
in advance. During 2009, actions were waiting for 
the advancement of the construction of the fuel 
handling buildings. The IAEA and the Commission 
visited the OL-3 construction site on 3 March 2010 
and on 27 April 2011 to adjust containment and 
surveillance instrumentation on site. The principal 
locations of cameras and control units were agreed 
to for the reactor building in 2010 and for the fuel 
handling building in 2011. The commissioning of 
the OL-3 unit is postponed until 2014.
The Decision-in-Principle (DiP) to construct the 
new Olkiluoto 4 reactor (OL-4) was made in July 
2010. The geotechnical works have started at the 
site, but the decisions for the reactor type and the 
vendor organisation are still pending. The nuclear 
construction license application with technical de-
tails is expected to be submitted within five years 
after the Decision-in-Principle.
The spent fuel storage building at the Olkiluoto 
NPP will be enlarged to have capacity for the spent 
fuel of the future. New ponds will be constructed 
for fuel assemblies from the operating reactors and 
from that under construction. During the enlarge-
ment and also during future operation, the exist-
ing surveillance is expected to cover accurately 
the whole enlargement area of the storage. The 
IAEA and the Commission inspectors reviewed 
the plans and visited the spent fuel storage during 
the site survey for remote data transmission for 
all Olkiluoto MBAs on 6–7 October 2011. Based 
on its own assessment as well as on IAEA and 
Commission inspection results, STUK concluded 
that TVO’s Olkiluoto NPP has complied with its 
nuclear safeguards obligations in 2011.
3.1.4 The VTT FiR1 research reactor site
In 2011 STUK carried out two interim inspections 
at the VTT research rector site. The site declara-
tion and activities and internal control systems 
were reviewed on 8 March. Safeguards inspectors 
from STUK and the European Commission veri-
fied the nuclear material inventory of VTT on 31 
August 2011. There were some inconsistencies in 
reporting but the nuclear material inventory was 
concluded to be correct during the inspection. The 
inventory and consequently the inspection was 
postponed and carried out in connection with the 
regular inspections scheduled in August. 
VTT submitted the operating licence applica-
tion to the Government on 30 November 2010. 
The handling of the application included a statu-
tory hearing procedure. During the handling pro-
cess there was special focus on ensuring that the 
continued use of the research reactor meets spe-
cific safety requirements. In its statement on 30 
October 2011, STUK commented also on the need 
for competences for the whole licensed period. On 
8 December 2011, the Government granted the op-
erating licence for VTT research reactor FiR1, until 
the end of 2023. In connection to this procedure, 
STUK examined a person to be nominated as the 
deputy for the responsible manager at the research 
reactor. The update of VTT’s nuclear materials 
handbook was approved in April 2011.
Based on its own assessment as well as on IAEA 
and Commission inspection results, STUK conclud-
ed that the VTT FiR1 operator has complied with 
its nuclear safeguards obligations in 2011.
3.1.5 The STUK site
Organisational questions at the STUK operator 
were remarked on by STUK Nuclear Materials 
Section. Owing to outsourcing of staff and ac-
tivities at the national waste receiving station of 
STUK, the responsibilities and boundaries at the 
operator were not clearly indicated. In 2011, STUK 
Nuclear Materials Section approved one new per-
son to be appointed as the responsible manager for 
nuclear safeguards at STUK and also a deputy for 
this manager. Thus, the operating unit at STUK 
fulfils the requirements for national safeguards 
arrangements. 
Based on its assessment and inspection results, 
STUK concluded that the STUK operator has 
complied with its nuclear safeguards obligations 
in 2011.
3.1.6 The University of Helsinki site
Safeguards inspectors from STUK and the 
European Commission verified the nuclear materi-
al inventory of the University of Helsinki on 3 June 
2010. As the Commission inspections scheduled for 
June 2011 at VTT, STUK and Helsinki University 
were not carried out as planned, the Commission 
inspection at STUK and University of Helsinki 
were postponed. STUK carried out its inspection of 
the University of Helsinki site on 25 March 2011.
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Based on its own assessment and inspection 
results, STUK concluded that the University of 
Helsinki has complied with its nuclear safeguards 
obligations in 2011.
3.1.7 Minor nuclear material holders
In 2011 several STUK inspections were focused on 
the minor nuclear material holders in order to as-
sure that the capabilities and procedures are ade-
quate. The new requirement, to be issued in a YVL 
Guide, to require a nuclear materials handbook 
also of the minor holders was already addressed 
above. As a routine, STUK inspected the reports 
from the minor nuclear material holders, but the 
number of inspections – five in total – to these mi-
nor holders’ premises was notable in 2011. During 
2010 and 2011 STUK has inspected all except one 
minor holders. The international inspectorates did 
not make any types of inspections to the minor 
holders.
Based on its own assessment and inspection 
results, STUK concluded that the minor nuclear 
material holders have complied with their nuclear 
safeguards obligations in 2011.
3.1.8 New operators in the front 
end of the fuel cycle
STUK granted an operation license to Norilsk 
Nickel Harjavalta for producing, storing and han-
dling uranium as a by-product of the nickel purifi-
cation process, for an annual amount of less than 
10 metric tons in 2010. In February 2011 STUK 
carried out the first inspection to this operator. 
In addition to safeguards, security and radiation 
protection issues were addressed during the in-
spection.
During early 2011 STUK evaluated the li-
cence application of Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd. 
to begin uranium production as a by-product at 
the Talvivaara nickel mine, and made a state-
ment to the Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy about radiation and nuclear safety, 
security and safeguards issues. STUK and the 
European Commission carried out the first Design 
Information Verification inspection to Talvivaara 
on 16 November 2011. The aim was to get to know 
the staff at the site and to agree on reporting pro-
cedures. Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd. got the approval 
from the Euratom Supply Agency to sell uranium 
concentrate to Cameco Corporation in November 
2011. It is expected that the European Commission 
will authorise and the Finnish Government will 
grant Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd the license for the 
uranium extraction plant in early 2012. Before 
commissioning the plant, STUK shall inspect all 
relevant arrangements, including the nuclear ma-
terials handbook and the responsible persons for 
nuclear material accountancy and control.
3.1.9 The final disposal facility site 
for spent nuclear fuel
During the year 2011 STUK carried out three in-
terim inspections at the underground premises 
of the final disposal facility. The IAEA and the 
Commission joined one of these by means of Design 
Information Verification. The IAEA inspected the 
underground premises, the shaft and the ventila-
tion technology building where there will be ac-
cess routes to the underground premises. STUK 
Nuclear Materials Section examined one person to 
be appointed as the responsible manager for the 
construction of the underground premises, called 
Onkalo, and approved one person to be nominated 
as responsible for safeguards at the facility.
Posiva updated its non-proliferation handbook 
in February, June and October 2011 to clarify and 
update the descriptions of Posiva’s safeguards 
practices. However, the updates did not consider 
the early provision of Design Information as in-
dicated by the IAEA and the Commission. In 
addition, STUK remarked on a few principal de-
scriptions in the handbook. Therefore, the updated 
handbooks were not accepted by STUK, and fur-
ther actions were requested of Posiva. 
The update in October contained a principal 
change in safeguards practices. Owing to experi-
ence of and difficulties in excavating the deep gal-
leries, the possible time window for inspecting the 
virgin rock surfaces was reduced to a minimum 
before shotcrete was applied to reinforce the deep 
underground premises. The operator has now on-
alert geologist and surveyors to map and document 
the rock surfaces after every blasting. No advance 
notifications are made before the surfaces are cov-
ered. Safeguards inspectors have to be acquainted 
with these changes made due to operational safety 
reasons. 
Several meetings were arranged between 
STUK, the Commission and the IAEA during the 
year 2011 in order to clarify and facilitate safe-
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guards measures for the final disposal of spent 
nuclear fuel. These meetings were focused on the 
verification issues prior to spent fuel encapsula-
tion. It was commonly agreed that the spent fuel 
verification should take place at the encapsulation 
plant. This was discussed with Posiva’s design 
managers at the Safeguards-by-Design meeting 
on 6 October 2011. It is expected that Posiva will 
submit the nuclear construction license application 
for the disposal facility in 2012. Therefore, it is im-
portant that designers are aware of the safeguards 
measures to be applied at the facility at an early 
stage of facility development.
3.1.10 Nuclear dual-use items, export licenses
In 2011 the Ministry for Foreign Affairs issued 
five licences for exporting nuclear process model-
ling software to Croatia, Slovakia, Sweden (two 
licenses) and the Czech Republic and one licence 
for exporting design information for a nuclear pow-
er plan to several European Union countries. In 
addition, the Ministry issued licences to export 
small amounts of nuclear material to Austria and 
Canada and calibration equipment to Germany. 
In 2011 there were new types of applications to 
handle dual-use item equipment and other sensi-
tive technology. TVO was granted licences to pos-
sess fuel handling machines and other items out-
side of the facility, i.e. temporarily in the Olkiluoto 
harbour. A Finnish engineering company was 
granted two licences to import, possess and trans-
fer nuclear technology to its fifteen subcontractors. 
A licence to possess this information was also 
granted to all these subcontractors. 
3.1.11 Transports of nuclear materials 
and nuclear waste
In 2011, fresh nuclear fuel was imported to Finland 
from Spain, Sweden and the Russian Federation 
(Table 1). In relation to these imports, three trans-
port plans, one transport security plan and its one 
update as well as one package design were ap-
proved by STUK. Furthermore, STUK granted ap-
provals for an update to a transport plan for nucle-
ar waste, one transport with special arrangements 
and one report regarding transport arrangements. 
In addition, STUK issued a certificate for non-ob-
jection for nuclear shipping and granted extra time 
for submission of material regarding a package de-
sign approval. STUK inspected three transports of 
fresh nuclear fuel during the year. The inspections 
were performed in cooperation with the police. 
Nuclear material and nuclear waste transports as 
well as STUK’s regulatory requirements were also 
discussed with the police in several meetings dur-
ing 2011.
3.1.12 International transfers of 
nuclear material
In 2011, TVO reported to STUK about its inter-
national fuel contracts, fuel transfers and fuel 
shipments. STUK carried out an on-site inspec-
tion where TVO’s nuclear material accountancy 
on the fresh fuel imported in 2011 was verified 
against the original shipment documents cover-
ing the international transfers. The accountancy 
of the natural uranium in TVO’s possession but 
stored outside of the Olkiluoto NPP site was also 
inspected. Based on the findings, STUK concluded 
that TVO has complied with its safeguards obliga-
tions in purchasing the nuclear fuel and managing 
its international transfers.
3.2 The Finnish National Data 
Centre for the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
3.2.1 International cooperation is the 
foundation of CTBT verification
During 2011 the Finnish National Data Centre 
(FiNDC) participated in meetings of the Working 
Group B (WGB) of the Preparatory Commission 
for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Organization (CTBTO). The WGB is a policy mak-
ing organ for the technical development of the veri-
fication regime. By participating in the work of the 
WGB and its subsidiaries (workshops and expert 
groups), the FiNDC can provide technical expertise 
to the CTBTO, while also attending to the Finnish 
national interests.
3.2.2 The analysis pipeline is a well 
established daily routine
The FiNDC continued developing its own routine 
monitoring system for the data received from the 
network of the International Monitoring System 
(IMS). The FiNDC routinely analyses all radio-
nuclide measurement data generated at the IMS 
radionuclide stations across the world. The IMS 
network is still developing, and the number of op-
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erational air filter stations was about 60 at the 
end of 2011 (at the final stage there will be 80). 
The operational stations generated more than 700 
gamma spectra per day for the FiNDC analysis 
pipeline to handle. The analysis pipeline is linked 
to the LINSSI database and equipped with an au-
tomated alarm system, to enable efficient and fully 
automated screening of the data.
The number of IMS stations equipped with 
radioxenon measurement capabilities was about 
30 at the end of 2011. Six IMS radioxenon systems 
where certified by the CTBTO by the end of 2011. 
During the year FiNDC started a joint project with 
Health Canada, to further develop the tools for an-
alysing and viewing radioxenon data. Radioxenon 
measurements are especially important for CTBT 
verification, because xenon, as a noble gas, often 
leaks also from underground tests, which seldom 
release particulate matter.
3.2.3 Fukushima radionuclides 
in the IMS network 
The IMS of the CTBTO includes global networks 
of seismic and radionuclide measuring stations. 
The seismic network provides real-time data to 
tsunami warning systems, and was able to assist in 
warning the Japanese public of the tsunami on 11 
March 2001. The radionuclide network provided re-
liable measurement data of the dispersion of radio-
nuclides throughout the northern hemisphere. The 
measurement process at air filter stations takes 72 
hours, from the start of collecting the sample on 
an air filter to the final result, while radioxenon 
stations provide final data in approximately 30-48 
hours, so the results are not normally available 
in real time. However, as experienced at one sta-
tion after the accident, if radionuclide levels are 
high enough in the station air, the measurement 
system will detect these nuclides directly (in situ), 
and provide reliable information of which radionu-
clides are present, though only coarse estimates 
of the activity level. Detecting such a situation is 
extremely important, as a misinterpretation would 
be strongly misleading, indicating that the plume 
had arrived two days earlier than it did.
The Finnish national data centre for the CTBT 
(FiNDC) analysed the IMS data as it arrived, and 
provided the STUK Emergency Preparedness with 
nuclide specific activity concentration information, 
which was unique in its reliability and global 
coverage. Through the above mentioned in situ 
process FiNDC could provide the first completely 
reliable information on the mix of gamma active 
radionuclides released from Fukushima, already 
in the morning of 15 March. Subsequently FiNDC 
continued to manually analyse IMS data from up 
to 40 stations daily and provided highly accurate 
and reliable information on the dispersion of ra-
dionuclides throughout the northern hemisphere. 
Within two weeks the cloud was seen on all IMS 
radionuclide stations in the northern hemisphere, 
and the released activity stayed detectable for ap-
proximately three months after the accident by a 
large number of stations. This was due to that the 
IMS network is extremely sensitive: it has a typical 
detection limit of about 1 μBq/m³. 
FiNDC also initiated an informal international 
cooperation between NDCs and affiliated organisa-
tions and distributed analyses results to several 
countries, for some weeks after the accident, while 
getting valuable information in return. Especially 
fruitful was the cooperation with Health Canada 
(HC), which uses a similar LINSSI database for 
storing IMS analysis results. Because of this 
FiNDC and HC could exchange analysis results 
directly on a database level, which effectively less-
ened the need of analysis work at both institutions.
3.3 International co-operation 
In the international nuclear safeguards develop-
ment fora, the major topics during the year 2011 
were related to the IAEA Long-Term Strategic 
Plan. The IAEA makes use of the full range of 
available information of safeguards relevance in 
order to build a complete picture of each state’s nu-
clear activities and capabilities. The IAEA plans to 
diversify the types of information that it uses and 
to take account of a broader range of state-specific 
factors which have hitherto been underutilised. 
The IAEA is developing a framework that links 
general state-level safeguards objectives to spe-
cific safeguards activities in a state in a way that 
reflects the establishment of risk-based priorities. 
The state-specific factors can be of technical nature, 
such as fuel cycle considerations, the use of remote 
monitoring and unannounced inspections, and the 
performance of the State System of Accounting for 
and Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC) in gen-
eral, while others can be of non-technical nature, 
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such as the history of safeguards implementation 
in the state, the degree of transparency with its 
nuclear programme and the level of cooperation 
between the state and the IAEA. These topics were 
addressed at the ESARDA symposium in Budapest 
and at the INMM annual meeting in Palm Desert 
and at the ESARDA-INMM symposium in Aix-en-
Provence. 
The implementation of safeguards in Finland 
was addressed at several meetings with the IAEA 
and the Commission. In addition, STUK continued 
its participation in the ESARDA working groups 
and in the steering committee meetings. STUK 
had a strong influence in the ESARDA Executive 
Board and via ESARDA also at the INMM and 
IAEA conferences as shown by several references 
in section 6.
Finland’s bilateral cooperation programmes in 
the area of non-proliferation are directed mainly 
towards our neighbouring countries outside the 
EU and are motivated by the continued need for 
enhancements in the regional security environ-
ment. Accordingly, STUK continued its cooperation 
programme with the Russian Federation under the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs’ regional cooperation 
programme. Collaboration with Ukraine in mutu-
ally beneficial areas was re-established in 2008 and 
an agreement about a programme was made be-
tween the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of 
Ukraine, since 2011 the State Nuclear Regulatory 
Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU) and STUK. 
In 2011 STUK contributed to the inter-insti-
tutional development cooperation programme of 
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs by  supporting the 
Geological Survey of Finland in their tasks related 
to uranium mining and milling in Namibia and 
Zambia. In both states there are plans for new ura-
nium mining, but authorities need assistance when 
developing mining regulations. In the non-prolif-
eration regime the main tasks in these two states 
are related to the ratification and implementation 
of the Additional Protocol. The co-operation with 
Namibia is comfortable owing to the personal con-
tacts established during the IAEA fellowship visit 
of Ms. Helena Itamba at STUK in 2006. Similarly, 
in 2011 STUK hosted two IAEA fellowship stu-
dents from the Czech Republic, and as a part of the 
co-operation under the EU framework a group of 
Egyptian safeguards authorities.
3.3.1 ESARDA Working Groups at STUK
The head of STUK’s Security Technology Labor-
atory continued his term as chairperson of the 
ESARDA Novel Approaches/Novel Techn ologies 
Working Group. The Meeting on Stand-off Detection 
Technologies was organised jointly between the 
Novel Approaches and Novel Technologies (NA/NT) 
Working Group and the ESARDA Non-destructive 
Analysis (NDA) Working Group. The meeting 
was hosted by STUK in Helsinki, Finland 28–29 
September 2011.
The joint working group meeting had three 
overall goals: firstly, to consider scientific and tech-
nological innovations that have potential applica-
tions for meeting current and future safeguards 
challenges; secondly, to establish contacts between 
participant end-users in international verification 
and non-proliferation organizations and leading 
R&D	 experts	 in	 new	 and	 novel	 technology	 ar-
eas; and thirdly, to introduce to the participants 
the long-term research and development plan of 
the IAEA Department of Safeguards. Over the 
two days of the meeting, 17 presentations were 
given. Presenter abstracts and their respective 
PowerPoint presentations can be found at the 
ESARDA CIRCA website.
3.3.2 The final disposal programme 
at several fora
In 2011, the group of experts for Application of 
Safeguards to Geological Repositories (ASTOR) 
met at Bure in France in October. Novel technolo-
gies to be applied for safeguards purposes at this 
new type of facility were presented and discussed 
during the meeting. STUK contributed to the satel-
lite imagery task. The final report of the sub-group 
was prepared for the ASTOR meeting. Seismic 
monitoring and experiences at the Olkiluoto re-
pository were discussed both at the ASTOR group 
and several ESARDA working groups during 2011. 
In addition to the repository safeguards, verifica-
tion of spent nuclear fuel prior to disposal was ad-
dressed at the ASTOR meeting.
The six-party group (the IAEA, the Commission, 
and Finnish and Swedish authorities and opera-
tors) founded in 2010 to develop safeguards meas-
ures for the final disposal processes in Finland 
and Sweden did not meet during 2011. However, 
the Finnish and Swedish authorities had a pre-
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meeting in November 2011 to define common tasks 
and needs. In particular, the technical needs for 
the verification of spent fuel to be disposed of were 
addressed. It is realised that the programmes in 
Sweden and in Finland are reaching the licens-
ing phase, and the safeguards measures are to be 
those agreed upon by all parties, facility designers, 
operators and the inspectorates.
3.3.3  Cooperation with the 
Rostechnadzor, Russia
Cooperation between Finnish and Russian authori-
ties, technical support organisations and industrial 
partners included seminars. A seminar was held on 
the rules for physical protection in transportation 
of radioactive sources and radioactive materials 
that are now in force in Russia. Also Rosenergoatom 
instructions on the “Implementation of confirm-
ing measurements of inventories and inventory 
changes in the system of the account and control of 
radioactive substances and waste” were reviewed. 
Another joint seminar was held in November to 
exchange information and experiences on the ac-
counting for and physical protection of radioac-
tive waste and disposal of low, intermediate and 
high-level radioactive waste from nuclear facilities, 
particularly NPPs. A technical visit was conducted 
to Olkiluoto NPP and to the disposal facility of low 
and intermediate level radioactive waste.
The demonstration of the spent fuel attrib-
ute tester (SFAT) measurement device for the 
Rostechnadzor was successfully carried out in 2008 
at the Kola nuclear power plant. Since that a new 
computer was obtained for the system and soft-
ware was installed accordingly, and steps were 
taken to organize the shipment to the Ozersk 
Office of the Rostechnadzor in 2011. This bilateral 
work complements the work done within the EU-
financed TACIS project aiming at improving the 
control of the handling of nuclear material at the 
Mayak reprocessing plant. The first part of this 
project was completed in 2010; the second part was 
completed in November 2011. In addition, a new 
pilot project was implemented to prove the security 
of confidential data and information communicated 
electronically within the inspection regime of the 
Rostechnadzor. 
The Finnish and Russian Customs Authorities 
decided to continue with the joint custom officers 
training activities. The two week joint training 
course and associated exercises were conducted 
in May 2011. The programme was focused more 
on practical work than during the first bilateral 
courses in 2007 and 2008. The Customs Authorities 
and STUK met in December 2011 to review the 
progress and experiences and to plan for the fu-
ture activities. Among the specific issues are metal 
scrap contaminated with radioactivity, and the new 
project on CBRN protection of the fast train con-
nection between St. Petersburg and Helsinki.
3.3.4  The programme with Ukraine: capacity 
building extends to new areas
Since 2009 the focus of the programme with 
Ukraine was on manufacturing and deliver-
ing a mobile laboratory vehicle for the use of the 
State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of Ukraine 
(SNRCU). The mobile measuring laboratory, called 
Sophisticated ON-site Nuclide Identification 
(SONNI) enables identifying and analysing radio-
active sources and nuclear materials in the en-
vironment, at industrial facilities and in cases of 
threatening situations. The laboratory includes 
measuring, sampling, positioning and communica-
tion systems. Data can be transmitted in real time 
to the control centre, where the data may be en-
tered into a map system, thus providing real-time 
information for the management of the operations. 
At locations where the vehicle cannot have access, 
a portable application with the same functionality 
can be used. 
The top-modern radiation measuring vehicle 
with the portable application unit was donated 
to the IAEA and further to the SNRCU in Kiev in 
December 2010. Two one-week long educational 
sessions were organised in the autumn to train the 
new crews, and a field exercise was conducted in 
December 2011. The capacity building in this area 
is financed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at it 
will continue also during 2012. 
In addition, a new EU project was approved by 
the European Commission to enhance the border 
control functions by provision of new technical 
means for CBRN protection of selected border sta-
tions or other nodal points. The Terms of Reference 
document has been discussed and STUK was 
identified by the European Commission as the 
implementing organisation. The project will be im-
plemented in 2012.
STUK continued its participation in the tasks of 
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the cooperation programme between the Swedish 
Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) and the Ukraine 
authorities including the renamed SNRIU. Experts 
from STUK participated in the review and develop-
ment of the national system of nuclear material ac-
countancy and control and in the non-proliferation 
regime including the nuclear fuel cycle related 
activities in Ukraine. The 2011 joint meeting was 
arranged by SSM in Stockholm in November 2011.
3.3.5 Regulations for uranium mining 
and milling in southern Africa
STUK and the Geological Survey of Finland are 
cooperating under the financing instrument inter-
institutional development and cooperation, which 
was launched in 2008 by the Finnish Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs (MFA), to promote small-scale pro-
jects between government authorities and agen-
cies. The Finnish public sector participates in de-
velopment cooperation by cooperating with the 
partner countries’ public sector. The objective of 
the projects is to support capacity-building in the 
partner agencies.
The Namupol project (Support for Drafting of 
Uranium Mining and Milling Policy, Legislation 
and Regulations and Development of Minerals 
Database) has its origins in a visit to Namibia 
by the Finnish Minister for Foreign Trade and 
Development in October 2008. In consultations 
with the minerals sector, half a dozen topics were 
identified and the need for a uranium production 
policy was considered to be the most pressing is-
sue. Due to the rapid upsurge in exploration for 
uranium in Namibia, the government had been 
forced to impose a moratorium on the issuance of 
new licenses. The Ministry of Mines and Energy of 
Namibia and the Geological Survey of Finland sub-
mitted a project proposal to the MFA in April 2009. 
This was revised in 2009 and radiation protection 
issues and nuclear regulations were incorporated 
in the proposal. An assignment was received from 
the MFA in September 2010 and the first policy 
workshop was held in Namibia in November 2010 
with participants from the Namibian stakeholders 
and Finnish partners, Geological Survey, STUK, 
and the MFA. At this workshop, it was announced 
that Namibia needs to have regulation, not only for 
uranium mining and milling, but also for the whole 
nuclear fuel cycle. This raised the importance 
of non-proliferation regulations since uranium 
production does not implicitly require safeguards 
measures like fuel cycle facilities and related tech-
nology do. The draft nuclear fuel cycle policy was 
written in 2011, and two stakeholder workshops 
were held in September and in December 2011.
In Zambia, there are no current industrial ura-
nium mining activities, though uranium has been 
mined in the past. Currently uranium is stockpiled 
and overseen at one of the Zambian copper mines 
as by-product, and in addition one mining license 
application for uranium mining in sandstone has 
been submitted to the local authorities. The na-
tional legislation has recently been updated for 
the mining of uranium. However, the MFA identi-
fied the need to improve legislation and financed 
the Geological Survey of Finland and STUK to 
carry out a mission to Zambia in 2011 to assess the 
mining, environmental and radiation protection 
legislation and relevant competences at the re-
sponsible authorities, i.e. the Zambian Ministry of 
Mines and Minerals Development, Environmental 
Management Agency and Radiation Protection 
Authority. In addition, the preparedness to imple-
ment the Additional Protocol and integrated safe-
guards was addressed.
3.3.6 International capacity building at STUK
In spring 2011 two IAEA fellowship visitors from 
the Czech State Office for Nuclear Safety (SUJB) 
spent a two-month training period at STUK 
Nuclear Materials office. The training period was 
an advanced and specialised course aiming for pro-
found knowledge of and experience on the Finnish 
safeguards field. Most of the training consisted of 
lectures and discussions given by the STUK ex-
perts. The number of sessions and different topics 
was around forty. The fellows participated actively 
in the daily safeguards work, attending regular 
meetings at STUK and inspections at facilities. 
In that way the fellows familiarised themselves 
with many aspects of the Finnish safeguards sys-
tem. The interaction was fruitful and valuable for 
the Finish safeguards staff as well. As a part of 
the training the fellows gave lectures about the 
safeguards practices in their country. Particular 
attention was paid to uranium mining and exist-
ing remote data transfer from the nuclear power 
plants (Figures 8 and 9).
A group consisting of staff members from the 
National Centre for Nuclear Safety and Radiation 
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Control (NCNSRC) of the Egyptian Atomic 
Energy Authority (EAEA) visited STUK for one 
week’s training under the provision of the EU’s 
Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC) 
project, with the aim of strengthening and en-
hancing EAEA’s capability in Nuclear Safeguards 
(Figure 10). During the week basic knowledge 
about the Finnish national safeguards system 
and its functions was presented. Within the INSC 
project the group subsequently participated in 
further complementary training and workshops 
at the French Institute for Radiological Protection 
and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) and at the Hungarian 
Atomic Energy Authority (HAEA) in September 
2011. The same basic information as shared with 
the Czech fellows in two months was given during 
one week of intensive lecture sessions. The train-
ing material produced for this training at STUK 
can serve also in the future, when introducing new 
safeguards inspectors worldwide.
Figure 10. Egyptian visitors at STUK. Among STUK’s 
staff, STUK summer trainee Suvi Lehtinen (first on the 
left) and French student Aurelien Lepetitdidier (5th in 
the back row from the left) joined the training.
Figure 8. Czech fellowship visitor Adam Pavlik ex-
changes experiences in safeguards implementation.
Figure 9. Ondrej Stastny gives lectures and exchanges 
experiences in safeguards implementation.
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4 Human resources development
Nuclear safeguards by the Nuclear Materials 
Section of STUK cover all typical measures of a 
State System of Accounting for and Control of 
Nuclear Materials (SSAC), and many other ac-
tivities besides. The nuclear fuel cycle related ac-
tivities, e.g. research and development activities 
not involving nuclear material and manufacture 
of certain equipment as defined it the Additional 
Protocol, have enlarged the scope of traditional 
safeguards. Nuclear safeguards on the national 
level are closely linked with other functions of nu-
clear materials control and non-proliferation: li-
censing, export control, border control, transport 
control, combating illicit trafficking, the physical 
protection of nuclear materials, and monitoring 
compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty (CTBT). Continuous analysis of the 
developments in the involved fields of both technol-
ogy and politics is a daily, multidisciplinary task at 
the STUK Nuclear Materials Section.
The personnel’s competence is systematically 
developed taking into account the needs of the 
organisation and the wishes of the individuals (see 
Figure 11). Those aiming at an expert’s career are 
valued as highly as those interested in managerial 
duties. At the Nuclear Materials Section during 
2011, the management participated in the gen-
eral course for managers at government organisa-
tions provided by the Finnish Institute of Public 
Management. The internal training programme of 
the section continued, and our experts also partici-
pated in a few international courses. There was one 
seminar lecture arranged at STUK: it concerned 
STUK’s regulatory requirements for Talvivaara 
mine. The Nuclear Materials Section hosted two 
IAEA fellowship students from the Czech Republic 
in the spring of 2011, and as a benefit of this schol-
arship visit, two STUK inspectors participated in 
the training course tailored for IAEA safeguards 
inspectors in June 2011 at the Dolni Rozinka mine, 
the only operating uranium mine in Europe, which 
is located in the Czech Republic. STUK also ar-
ranged a visit to uranium production facilities in 
Canada and to Health Canada for staff at MEE 
and STUK, including the STUK Nuclear Materials 
Section Deputy Director, who is responsible for 
the licensing of the Talvivaara mine. Two of the 
Nuclear Materials Section staff members partici-
pated in a 5-week national course for nuclear 
safety and one staff member took part in a course 
regarding marine transports.
The RADAR project, which aims to upgrade the 
radiation monitoring systems at the Finnish bor-
der crossing stations, is running from 2009 to 2014. 
The main goals of the project are to modernise ra-
diation monitoring equipment at the Finnish bor-
der crossing stations and to educate the personnel 
of the stations. The project is done in cooperation 
with the Finnish Customs, who are the end users 
of the equipment. Suvi Lehtinen was employed at 
STUK as a trainee during the summer to assist 
the instrumentation at the border control stations. 
The main outcome of 2011 was the procurement 
of the Helsinki-Vantaa airport system. An airport 
is a challenging monitoring environment, since all 
traffic is typically very hectic. The new radiation 
monitoring system utilizes novel system architec-
ture, which facilitates quick response in case of an 
alarm. It will be taken into operational use during 
the first half of 2012. 
In addition to being the responsible section 
for the above cases, the personnel of the Nuclear 
Materials Section assist other sections in response 
to any incidents that may include nuclear materi-
als or require their expertise for some other reason. 
Some of the Nuclear Materials Section staff are 
also part of the pool of Experts-on-Duty, who re-
ceive the notifications for incidents and are respon-
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Figure 11. The staff of Nuclear Materials Section.
sible for initiating STUK's response. In 2011, a few 
staff members of the Nuclear Materials Section 
took part in the bi-annual emergency exercise at 
the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant. The Fukushima 
accident caused intensive work in March and April, 
and additional tasks during the rest of the year, 
too.
The staff of STUK Nuclear Materials Section in the same order as in the photo, from left to right. All section staff 
participate in the core safeguards tasks. Additionally, each person has some special areas of expertise to focus 
on.
Ms. Ritva Kylmälä Assistant 
Ms. Anna Lahkola Senior Inspector Transport of nuclear materials, central accountancy
Mr. Tapani Honkamaa Senior Inspector Non-destructive assay, FINSP to the IAEA safeguards
Ms. Elina Martikka Section Head Management
Mr. Timo Ansaranta Inspector Control of competence at facilities and at small holders
Mr. Olli Okko Senior Inspector Safeguards of research and development, final disposal
Mr. Antero Kuusi Inspector Databases, non-destructive assay
Mr. Marko Hämäläinen Senior Inspector Inspection coordination, handbooks, Additional Protocol implementation
Mr. Mikael Moring Senior Inspector Finnish National Data Centre for the CTBT, non-destructive assay, 
environmental sampling
Mr. Risto Paltemaa Director Resourcing, Management
Ms. Arja Tanninen Deputy Director Licensing, permits
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5 Conclusions
STUK continued with national safeguards meas-
ures and field activities with 77 inspection days 
and 45 inspections. The implementation of the 
IAEA integrated safeguards began in Finland on 
15 October 2008. Thus, the year 2009 was the first 
whole year with the new approach. The number of 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in-
spection days was reduced from the approximately 
25 person days per year of the past to 13. Similarly, 
the European Commission reduced its inspection 
activities to 14 person days. In 2010 and 2011 the 
number of the inspection days of these interna-
tional organisations was somewhat higher than in 
2009, because of the raised number on random in-
terim inspections, partly due to new stakeholders 
to be inspected. In 2010 and 2011 the number of 
inspection days has been close to 20 per year. The 
implementation of the IAEA integrated safeguards 
reduces the total number of annual routine inspec-
tions days of the international inspectorates, but it 
includes short notice random inspections. In order 
to be present at all of the short notice IAEA inspec-
tions STUK has preparedness to have a daily on-
the-alert inspector. 
In 2011 STUK performed 29 safeguards inspec-
tions at the Finnish nuclear power plants (NPP), 
nine at the Loviisa NPP and 17 at the Olkiluoto 
NPP. The Commission and the IAEA took part in 
19 of these inspections. STUK performed three 
non-destructive assay measurement campaigns, 
two at the Loviisa NPP and two at the Olkiluoto 
NPP. In 2011 STUK carried out five inspections of 
the minor holders of nuclear materials. At other 
facilities, the Commission took part in the physical 
inventory verification at the VTT research reac-
tor and in the verification of the basic technical 
characteristics at the Talvivaara Sotkamo mine, 
and together with the IAEA in the design informa-
tion verification of the geological repository at the 
final disposal site at Olkiluoto. The IAEA sent its 
safeguards statements to the Commission, which 
amended them with its own conclusions and for-
warded them to STUK. The conclusions by the 
Commission were in line with IAEA’s remarks as 
well as STUK’s findings; there were no outstanding 
questions by the IAEA or the Commission at the 
end of 2011.
The results of STUK’s nuclear safeguards in-
spection activities continued to demonstrate that 
the Finnish licence holders take good care of their 
nuclear materials. There were no indications of un-
declared materials or activities and the inspected 
materials and activities were in accordance with 
the licence holders’ declarations. One stakehold-
er's organisational safeguards procedures were 
remarked at during the year. Neither the IAEA nor 
the Commission made any remarks nor did they 
present any required actions based on their inspec-
tions. By their nuclear materials accountancy and 
control systems, all license holders enabled STUK 
to fulfil its own obligations under the international 
agreements relevant to nuclear safeguards and 
non-proliferation.
The purpose of the Finnish chemical, biologi-
cal, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) Task Force, 
of which STUK is a member, is to advance mea-
sures to deter, prevent, detect and respond to il-
licit CBRN activities, and to enhance coordination 
and cooperation between national authorities in-
volved in the counter-CBRN effort. In 2011 STUK's 
Nuclear Materials Section cooperated closely with 
the Finnish Customs to offer expert advice in the 
development of radiation monitoring at borders, 
including training for Customs officers.
A major goal of all current Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) related activities 
is the entry into force of the CTBT itself. To reach 
this goal, major steps have to be taken in the politi-
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cal arena, and an important prerequisite for posi-
tive political action is that the verification system 
of the CTBTO is functioning and able to provide as-
surance to all parties that it is impossible to make 
a clandestine nuclear test without getting detected. 
The FiNDC is committed to its own role in the com-
mon endeavour so that the verification system of 
the CTBTO can accomplish its detection task. The 
radionuclide network provided reliable measure-
ment data of the dispersion of radionuclides from 
the Fukushima accident throughout the northern 
hemisphere. The FiNDC analysed the data from 
the International Monitoring System, as it arrived, 
and provided information to the STUK Emergency 
Preparedness during the evaluation and assess-
ment of the consequences of the accident.
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7 Abbreviations and acronyms
ADR
European Agreement con-
cerning the International 
Carriage of Dangerous Goods 
by Road
AP
Additional Protocol to the 
Safeguards Agreement
AQG
Atomic Questions Group of 
the Council of the European 
Union
ASTOR
Application of Safeguards to 
Geological Repositories
BTC
Basic Technical 
Characteristics
CA
Complementary Access
CBRN
Chemical, biological, radio-
logical and nuclear (such as 
in “protective measures taken 
against CBRN weapons or 
hazards”)
CdZnTe
Cadmium zinc telluride
CTBT
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty
CTBTO
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty Organization
DIQ
Design Information 
Questionnaire
DIV
Design Information 
Verification
DU
Depleted uranium
eFORK
enhanced FORK with a 
CdZnTe-gamma spectrometer 
(see FORK)
ES
Environmental Sampling
ESARDA
European Safeguards 
Research and Development 
Association
EU
European Union
FA
(1) Facility Attachment ac-
cording to the Safeguards 
Agreement (INFCIRC/193), 
(2) Fuel Assembly
FiNDC
Finnish National Data 
Centre for the CTBT
FINSP
Finnish Support Programme 
to the IAEA Safeguards
FORK
Spent fuel verifier with gross 
gamma and neutron detec-
tion
GBUV
Gamma Burnup Verifier
GICNT
Global Initiative for 
Combating Nuclear 
Terrorism
HAEA
Hungarian Atomic Energy 
Authority
HC
Health Canada
HEU
High-enriched uranium
HPGe
High-Purity Germanium
IAEA
International Atomic Energy 
Agency
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IMS
International Monitoring 
System (of the CTBTO)
ITU
Institute of Transuranium 
Elements in Karlsruhe
INFCIRC
Information Circular 
(IAEA document type, eg. 
INFCIRC/193, Safeguards 
Agreement, or INFCIRC/140, 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty)
IPPAS
International Physical 
Protection Advisory Service
IRSN
Institut de Radioprotection et 
de Sûreté Nucléaire (French 
Institute for Radiological 
Protection and Nuclear 
Safety)
IS
Integrated Safeguards
ISSAS
International SSAC Advisory 
Service
ITWG
International Technical 
Working Group for combating 
illicit trafficking of nuclear 
and other radioactive materi-
als
JRC
The Joint Research Centre
KMP
Key Measurement Point
LEU
Low-enriched uranium
LINSSI
an SQL database for gamma-
ray spectrometry
MBA
Material Balance Area
MEE
Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy
MFA
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
NDA
Non-Destructive Assay
NM
Nuclear Material
NPP
Nuclear Power Plant
NPT
The Treaty on the Non-
proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (INFCIRC/140, 
“Non-Proliferation Treaty”)
NSG
Nuclear Suppliers’ Group
Onkalo
Underground rock character-
isation facility (for the final 
disposal of spent nuclear 
fuel)
PIT
Physical Inventory Taking
PIV
Physical Inventory 
Verification
PSP
Particular Safeguards 
Provisions
PTS
Provisional Technical 
Secretariat (to the 
Preparatory Commission of 
the CTBT)
Pu
Plutonium
RL07
Radionuclide Laboratory to 
the CTBT hosted by STUK 
(FIL07)
SA
Subsidiary Arrangements
SAGSI
Standing Advisory Group on 
Safeguards Implementation
SFAT
Spent Fuel Attribute Tester
SNRCU
State Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission of Ukraine
SNRI
Short Notice Random 
Inspection
SNRIU
State Nuclear Regulatory 
Inspectorate of Ukraine (prev. 
SNRCU)
SNUICA
Short notice, unannounced 
inspection, complementary 
access, on-alert inspector
SSAC
State System of Accounting 
for and Control of Nuclear 
Materials
SSM
Swedish Radiation Safety 
Authority
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SUJB
Czech State Office for 
Nuclear Safety
Th
Thorium
U
Uranium
UI
Unannounced Inspection
UNSC
United Nations Security 
Council
VTT
Technical Research Centre of 
Finland
WGB
Working Group B (of the 
CTBTO)
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Table 1. Summary of nuclear material receipts and shipments at NPPs in 2011.
To From FA LEU (kg) Pu (kg)
W0L1 Spain 116 20 509 –
W0L2 (1/3) Sweden 60 10 387 –
W0L2 (2/3) Sweden 46 7 961 –
W0L2 (3/3) Spain 4 721 -
WL0V (1/2) Russian Federation 128 15 997 –
WL0V (2/2) Russian Federation 130 16 288 –
 W0L1, W0L2  = Olkiluoto NPP, WL0V = Loviisa NPP, FA = fuel assembly; LEU = low-enriched uranium, Pu = plutonium. 
APPENDIX 1 Nuclear materials in Finland in 2011
Table 2. Fuel assemblies at 31 December 2011.
MBA FA/SFA *) LEU (kg) Pu (kg)
W0L1 1 022/444 175 556 676
W0L2 1 005/433 167 702 625
W0LS 6 556/6 556 1 110 318 9 306
WL0V 4 851/4 171 561 874 5 075
MBA = material balance area, FA = fuel assembly, SFA = spent fuel assembly
*) FAs in core are accounted as fresh fuel assemblies  
(Loviisa NPP 313 FAs and Olkiluoto NPP 500 FAs per reactor)
Table 3. Total amounts of nuclear material at 31 December 2011.
MBA Natural U (kg) Enriched U* (kg) Depleted U (kg) Plutonium (kg) Thorium (kg)
W0L1 – 195 086 – 876 –
W0L2 – 167 742 – 626 –
W0LS – 1 110 318 – 9 306 –
WL0V – 593 001 – 5 304 –
WRRF 1 511 60.098 0.002 < 0.001 0.063
WFRS 0.170 0.537 99.952 ~ 0 0.083
WKK0 2 599.7 – – – –
WHEL 49.717 0.293 20.010 0.003 2.992
Minor holders  0.216 0.00115 1233.1 ~ 0  0.163
MBA = material balance area, WRRF = VTT FiR-1/VTT Processes, WFRS = STUK, WKK0 = OMG Kokkola Chemicals, WHEL = Laboratory of Radiochemistry at the 
University of Helsinki, U = uranium. *) Less than 150 g of high-enriched uranium, mainly used in detectors.
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APPENDIX 2 Safeguards field activities in 2011
General information Inspections Inspection  person days
MBA Date Inspection type IAEA COM STUK IAEA COM STUK
WNNH/Norilsk 
Nickel Harjavalta 3 February Initial inspection 0 0 1 0 0 2
WL0V 2 March Interim inspection + site check 0 0 2 0 0 2
WRRF 8 March Activities and site 0 0 1 0 0 1
W0L1, W0L2, W0LS 22–23 March Interim Inspection 0 0 3 0 0 3
W0LF 22 March As built DIV 0 0 1 0 0 2
WL0V 22 March Complementary Access 1 1 1 2 1 1
SSFHYRL (WHEL) 25 March Site check 0 0 1 0 0 1
SSFSTUK(WFRS) 25 March Site check 0 0 1 0 0 1
W0L1, W0L2 26  April Pre-PIT 2 2 2 2 2 2
W0L3 27 April DIV 1 1 1 1 1 1
W0L1 6 May OL1  core verification 0 0 1 0 0 1
W0L2 3 June OL2  core verification 0 0 1 0 0 1
W0LS, W0L1, W0L2 28–29 June Interim inspection PIV 3 3 3 3 3 3
W0LF 30 June As built DIV 1 1 1 1 1 1
WL0V 6 July Interim Inspection 0 0 1 0 0 1
W0LS 16 August PIV 1 1 1 1 1 1
WL0V 18–19 August Pre-PIT 1 1 1 1 1 1
WL0V 29 August LO1 core verification 0 0 1 0 0 1
WL0V 30 August Transfer cask verification 1 1 1 1 1 1
WRRF 31 August PIV 0 1 1 0 1 1
WL0V 17 September LO2 core verification 0 0 1 0 0 1
TVO, Helsinki 
Headquarter 23 September
International uranium transfer 
bookkeeping 0 0 1 0 0 1
WL0V 3–4 October PIV 1 1 1 4 2 2
W0L1, W0L2, W0LS 6–7 October Site survey for Remote Data Transmission 3 3 3 3 3 3
W0LF 7 October As built DIV 0 0 1 0 0 2
SF0304CA/ 
Inspecta Oy 19 October PIV + System inspection 0 0 1 0 0 2
SF0336CA/AEL Oy 20 October PIV + System inspection 0 0 1 0 0 2
WDPJ 3 November PIV + System inspection 0 0 1 0 0 2
SF0325CA/MAP 
Medical 
Technologies Oy
4 November PIV + System inspection 0 0 1 0 0 2
WTAL 16 November BTC verification 0 1 1 0 2 2
W0L1 16 November SNRI 1 1 1 1 1 1
WL0V 23 November UI 1 0 1 1 0 1
W0L2, W0LS 8 December Interim inspection 0 0 2 0 0 2
SF0303CA/
Rautaruukki Oyj 13 December PIV + System inspection 0 0 1 0 0 1 
NDA MEASUREMENTS
W0LS 31 August  – 2 September GBUV 0 0 1 0 0 9
W0L2 10–12 October GBUV 0 0 1 0 0 9
WL0V (KPA-varasto) 31 October – 2 November eFORK 0 0 1 0 0 6
TOTAL 17 18 45 22 21 77
Note: At the Olkiluoto NPP, inspections are counted per MBA. MBA = material balance area, PIV = Physical Inventory Verification, CA = Complementary Access,  
ES = Environmental Sampling, NM = nuclear material, SFAT/eFORK/GBUV = methods of non-destructive assay.
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APPENDIX 3 International agreements and national 
legislation relevant to nuclear safeguards in Finland
Valid legislation, treaties and agreements concern-
ing safeguards of nuclear materials and other nu-
clear items at the end of 2010 in Finland (Finnish 
Treaty Series, FTS):
1. The Nuclear Energy Act, 11 December, 1987/990 
as amended.
2. The Nuclear Energy Decree, 12 February, 
1988/161 as amended.
3. The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons INFCIRC/140 (FTS 11/70).
4. The Agreement with the Kingdom of Belgium, 
the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the 
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom 
of Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy 
Community and the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency in Implementation of Article III, 
(1) and (4) of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/193), 14 September 
1997. Valid for Finland from 1 October 1995.
5. The Protocol Additional to the Agreement be-
tween the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of 
Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ire-
land, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg, the Kingdom of Netherlands, the 
Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the 
Kingdom of Sweden, the European Atomic En-
ergy Community and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency in Implementation of Article iii, 
(1) and (4) of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, 22 September 1998. Entered 
into force on 30 April 2004.
6. The Treaty establishing the European Atom-
ic Energy Community (Euratom Treaty), 25 
March 1957:
•	 Regulation	No	5,	amendment	of	the	list	in	
Attachment VI, 22 December 1958
•	 Regulation	No	9,	article	197,	point	4	of	the	
Euratom Treaty, on determining concentra-
tions of ores, 2 February 1960.
7. Commission Regulation (Euratom) No 302/2005, 
8 February 2005
8. Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 setting up 
a Community regime for the control of exports, 
transfer, brokering, and transit of dual use 
items.
9. The Agreement with the Government of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the Republic of 
Finland for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses 
of Atomic Energy (FTS 16/69). Articles I, II, III 
and X expired on 20 February 1999.
10. The Agreement with the Government of the 
Russian Federation (the Soviet Union signed) 
and the Government of the Republic of Finland 
for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic 
Energy (FTS 39/69). Articles 1, 2, 3 and 11 ex-
pired on 1.12.2004.
11. The Agreement between the Government of 
the Kingdom of Sweden and the Government of 
the Republic of Finland for Co-operation in the 
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy 580/70 (FTS 
41/70). Articles 1, 2 and 3 expired on 5.9.2000.
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12. The Agreement between Sweden and Finland 
concerning guidelines on export of nuclear ma-
terials, technology and equipment (FTS 20/83).
13. The Agreement between the Government of Re-
public of Finland and the Government of Cana-
da and Canada concerning the uses of nuclear 
materials, equipment, facilities and information 
transferred between Finland and Canada (FTS 
43/76). Substituted to the appropriate extent by 
the Agreement with the Government of Canada 
and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom) in the peaceful Uses of Atomic En-
ergy, 6 October 1959 as amended.
14. The Agreement on implementation of the Agree-
ment with Finland and Canada concerning the 
uses of nuclear materials, equipment, facilities 
and information transferred between Finland 
and Canada (FTS 43/84).
15. The Agreement between the Government of Re-
public of Finland and the Government of Aus-
tralia concerning the transfer of nuclear mate-
rial between Finland and Australia (FTS2/80). 
Substituted to the appropriate extent by the 
Agreement between the Government of Aus-
tralia and the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity concerning transfer of nuclear material 
from Australia to the European Atomic Energy 
Community.
16. The Agreement for Cooperation with the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Finland and the 
Government of the United States concerning 
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (FTS 37/92). 
Substituted to the appropriate extent by the 
Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses 
of Nuclear Energy with European Atomic En-
ergy Community and the USA.
17. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(FTS 15/2001). This treaty was ratified by Fin-
land in 2001, but will not enter into force before 
it is ratified by all 44 states listed in Annex II of 
the treaty.
